Ir¨¢n y Am¨¦rica Latina
Cable sobre los trabajadores iran¨ªes en sectores de miner¨ªa venezolana
Estados Unidos analiza, en 2006, la colaboraci¨®n entre Venezuela e Ir¨¢n y estudia la capacidad de Caracas en la explotaci¨®n de uranio
| ID: | 59845 |
| Date: | 2006-04-07 20:19:00 |
| Origin: | 06CARACAS958 |
| Source: | Embassy Caracas |
| Classification: | SECRET//NOFORN |
| Dunno: | 05CARACAS1822 06CARACAS330 06CARACAS661 06HAVANA4139 |
| Destination: | VZCZCXRO6675 PP RUEHAG DE RUEHCV #0958/01 0972019 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 072019Z APR 06 FM AMEMBASSY CARACAS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4003 INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEM COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA PRIORITY 6275 RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 5360 RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ PRIORITY 1877 RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA PRIORITY 0083 RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO PRIORITY 1952 RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO PRIORITY 3674 RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 0655 RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES PRIORITY 1129 RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO PRIORITY 3426 RUEHMU/AMEMBASSY MANAGUA PRIORITY 1124 RUEHDG/AMEMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO PRIORITY 0110 RUEHAO/AMCONSUL CURACAO PRIORITY 0723 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0090 RUEHMI/USOFFICE FRC FT LAUDERDALE PRIORITY 2980 RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA PRIORITY 0622 |
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 CARACAS 000958 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD FOR FRC LAMBERT E.O. 12958: DNG: CO 04/08/2026 TAGS: PGOV, MASS, PARM, VE SUBJECT: EXPLAINING VENEZUELA'S COZINESS WITH IRAN, C-NE6-00140 REF: A. CARACAS 00661 B. 05 CARACAS 01822 C. CARACAS 00330 D. TD-314/18176-06 E. TD-314/18093-06 F. HAVANA 04139 G. IIR 6 902 9642 06 CARACAS 00000958 001.2 OF 005 Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT R. DOWNES FOR 1.4 (D) ------- Summary ------- 1. (S//NF) Manifest in the public rhetoric of both countries, a shared hatred for the USG is the driving factor in the budding relationship between Iran and Venezuela. The BRV is favoring Iran with petroleum deals and other contracts that appear to make little commercial sense. Although rumors of Venezuela's cooperation with an Iranian nuclear weapons program appear baseless, Iran and Venezuelan spokesmen have announced their intention to develop Venezuela's civilian nuclear capabilities. Press reports and Embassy contacts suggest Venezuela is preparing to try to exploit its own uranium deposits with Iran's assistance. Sensitive reporting indicates Venezuela may also be seeking armaments, cooperation on maintaining aircraft purchased from the United States, and help in training its military reserves. Post will continue to monitor the relationship while seeking to exploit Venezuela's missteps as it isolates itself from countries alarmed about Iran's nuclear ambitions. End summary. 2. (SBU) Iran and Venezuela have been signing bilateral agreements galore. Iranian parliamentary speaker Gholam-Ali Haddad Adel told the press during his visit to Caracas in mid-February that the two countries had signed 100 accords. Iranian President Mohammad Khatami and Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez inked twenty of these together in March 2005, including plans to cooperate in petrochemical, agricultural, and housing projects. Venezuela often signs agreements to show off its importance on the world stage without following through. Yet, in the case of Iran, there appears to be more to the budding relationship than show. Below we examine several possible explanations for the bilateral coziness, in rough order of importance. -------- Ideology -------- 3. (SBU) Iran shares a disdain for the U.S. Government that the BRV seeks in its foreign allies. Chavez' ill-defined, left-wing, anti-American ideology often drives his foreign policy decisions, even when his foreign counterparts only appear to be seeking commercial benefits. With Iran, however, he has found a partner that shares his desire to try to face down the United States. Evident in his daily rhetoric, Chavez' ideology--and his accompanying attempts to use it to stir up his political base--best explain his decision to isolate himself from much of the world by supporting Iran. (Venezuela joined only Syria and Cuba in voting February 4 to oppose Iran's referral to the U.N. Security Council for its involvement in uranium enrichment.) Chavez, who regularly alleges the U.S. military has stolen Iraq's oil, has accused Washington of having designs on Iran's supply. Other BRV officials have taken Chavez' ideological cue to the point of making Venezuela appear CARACAS 00000958 002.2 OF 005 fanatical. General Alberto Muller, a key proponent and planner of Venezuela's new military doctrine, announced February 14 that Iran would be acting "in legitimate defense" if it were to use nuclear arms, although he cautioned that Venezuela did not support the production of such weapons. According to Argentine newspaper La Nacion, Venezuelan Ambassador to Argentina Roger Capella Mateo stormed out of a Mercosur meeting with Spanish Foreign Minister Miguel Angel Moratinos when Moratinos said his country opposed Iran's refusal to submit to nuclear controls. --------- Petroleum --------- 4. (C) Ideology may be the only explanation for bilateral cooperation in the petroleum sector. Iran and Venezuela appear to enjoy each other's company as fellow radical oil-producing countries. Both Iran and Venezuela are OPEC price hawks, but their solidarity on the supply issue does not appear to have translated into many mutual benefits. Foreign Minister Ali Rodriguez told reporters March 11 that Iran and Venezuela were signing agreements because their oil policies coincided, but mentioned nothing tangible, digressing into how Venezuela could benefit from Iranian experience in the cooperative movement and in developing small agricultural machines. Venezuela has granted the Iranian company Petropars the rights to certify a block in the Faja region. The Iranians, however, have no experience exploiting the extra heavy crude found in the area. (The industry perception is that if a company is granted rights to study a block in the Faja, it will eventually be given a block in the area to exploit.) Chevron representatives told us that the Iranians approached them seeking assistance on carrying out the certification studies. -------------------------------------- Commercial Agreements: Who's to Gain? -------------------------------------- 5. (C) A USD 200 million binational fund to finance investment in both countries could ensure that commercial ties continue to grow. Nonetheless, the unprofitability of many of the deals inked with Iran again raises the question of whether ideological factors are driving the relationship. For example, in January Venezuela offered Iran contracts to build low-income housing even though Iran's bid was twice as expensive as the Venezuelan private sector's. (Note: corruption could explain the overpricing, as well.) Venezuela also plans to build a USD 220 million cement plant to supply the local market with Iran's help. Such a plant would appear to be a poor investment. Despite the enormous transportation costs for cement, multinational CEMEX currently exports cement from Venezuela for a price lower than the going Venezuela rate because its local buyers delay payments, according to a prominent economic contact. Chavez announced in February he would import 10 Iranian plants to process corn flour, a Venezuelan staple. The BRV likely sees the state takeover of this industry as a solution to recent shortages caused by its price controls. In another example of state economic planning and ideological ties trumping sound investment planning, Iran will establish an ethanol plant in Lara State, according to press reports. The BRV may view the production of ethanol--a by-product of sugar refinery--as a fringe benefit to its project to resurrect failed Cuban sugar mills in Venezuela. ---------------------------------------- Going Nuclear?: Uranium Rumors and More CARACAS 00000958 003.2 OF 005 ---------------------------------------- 6. (C) As reported REF A, recent rumors that Venezuela is trafficking in nuclear weapons and mining uranium for Iran appear to be little more than the conspiracy-mongering by Chavez adversaries. More disconcerting, however, are BRV and GOI statements that suggest a long-term plan to develop Venezuela's nuclear potential. Chavez mentioned on his weekly "Alo Presidente" program in May 2005 the possibility of asking help from "countries like Iran" in developing a nuclear energy program. In February 2006, Iran publicly affirmed its willingness to help Venezuela develop nuclear energy, according to press reports. (See REF B for a description of Venezuela's need for foreign expertise to restart the fledgling nuclear program it shut down in the 1980s.) In March 2005, a memorandum of understanding signed by the Iranian and Venezuelan Presidents established that Iran would help Venezuela create a "National Geoscience Database" that would contain a survey of the mineral deposits throughout Venezuelan territory. Tomasso Tosini, geologist and director of the Earth Sciences Institute of the Central University of Venezuela, told us in June 2005 that creating such a "basic geological map" of Venezuela would be the logical first step to restarting a uranium program in Venezuela. 5. (C) During a February 2006 meeting with poloff, UCV professor and senior Accion Democratica party official Nelson Lara claimed to have information substantiating Iran's involvement in Venezuela's mineral sector. Lara said active duty military officers in his classes told him that 20 Iranian officials were working in the Ministry of Basic Industry and Mines. He said the Iranians did not answer to any Venezuelan management. Lara speculated about their involvement in uranium mining but said he did not know the Iranians' role in the ministry. He added that 37 Iranians were active in the Venezuelan Institute of Geology and Mines, which Chavez launched in mid-2004. 6. (C) Venezuelan threats to take over property in areas believed to have significant radioactive deposits are fueling additional rumors that Venezuela is planning to mine uranium. (Embassy note: Rumors that the BRV is planning to mine these areas appear overblown. Factors besides uranium are driving the government's targeting of land, although the delays in expropriations reported in REF C could also reflect BRV attempts to drag out negotiations for land until it can gauge the true value of properties' mineral wealth.) In the mid-1980s, the Ministry of Energy and Mines conducted preliminary geochemical samplings that indicated the possible presence of uranium deposits in at least two locations currently eyed by the government: -- The study revealed "anomalous areas to be assessed in more detail" along the Caroni River in Bolivar State, where the National Guard has begun evicting individual gold and diamond prospectors reportedly to prevent them from damaging the environment. In mid-March, National Guard attempts to dislodge people from the Caroni basin ended in the deaths of two miners. Demanding the withdrawal of soldiers stationed in the Venezuelan military's fifth theater of operations (TO5), miners responded by blocking roads and burning TO5 facilities. -- The ministry report cited a section of Cojedes State as a source of concentrated uranium. The area contains ranch and nature preserve Hato Pinero, which the government has targeted for possible expropriation. Concerned that the ranch's alleged mineral wealth might attract BRV interest, CARACAS 00000958 004.2 OF 005 ranch owner Jaime Perez Branger gave us a copy of an earlier (1959) Ministry of Mines report calling Pinero's granite "the most radioactive in the region." A footnote in the document, however, noted that the counters used in the 1959 study would not have detected uranium ore, one of many possible sources of radioactivity. ------- Defense ------- 7. (S//NF) Defense cooperation may also help explain the expansion of the bilateral relationship (REFS D and E). Indeed, an army official is scheduled to replace the current Iranian Ambassador to Venezuela. According to sensitive reporting, the Venezuelan Government is seeking lethal armament from Iran such as rockets and other explosive materiel. Venezuela has also sought from Iran parts for the U.S. aircraft in its fleet that have been denied under the Department's policy prohibiting the sale of components for lethal munitions. Finally, sensitive reporting suggests that Venezuela has sought help from Iran in establishing its military reserve force. The Iranian popular mobilization army (Basij) and the revolutionary guard corps (IRGC) invite comparison with Venezuela's still evolving parallel military structures: the reserves and the territorial guard. Commander of the Basij Gen. Mohammed Hejazi visited Venezuela in 2005, and an IRGC colonel has arrived here probably on permanent assignment. A retired military officer citing Venezuelan reservists told us March 24 that Iran had a small number of soldiers in Venezuela training the reserves. --------------- Shared Culture? --------------- 8. (S//NF) Venezuela has a Muslim population of about 250,000 including some tens of thousands of Shia'. In addition to its political activities, the nine Iranians--including four career diplomats--posted to the Iranian Embassy in Venezuela represent a small but growing number of their citizens working in Venezuela in both the formal and informal sectors. Cultural ties between the two countries, however, do little to help explain the expanding relationship. Most Venezuelans are unfamiliar with Muslims and are unable to distinguish Iranians from Arabs or from other Muslims. Indeed, as REF F states about Iran and Cuba, Venezuelan and Iranian societies have little more in common than their despotic leaders' antipathy toward the United States. ------- Comment ------- 9. (C) Venezuela's support for a country that has nuclear ambitions, supports terrorism, and talks about wiping Israel off the map is of grave concern. It also alarms nations--such as France (REF G)--that have tended to make light of our concerns about Venezuela's antidemocratic tendencies and militarization. We can exploit this alarm. Just as the shared animosity toward Washington driving the Iran-Venezuela relationship leads to irrational commercial endeavors, it is also likely to lead to additional diplomatic gaffes and other missteps that reflect poorly on the BRV among wary international observers. 10. (C) We should not dismiss the uranium rumors. At the very least, it appears clear Venezuela plans to prospect for CARACAS 00000958 005.2 OF 005 uranium with the intention of starting a nuclear program. Like many BRV schemes, the plan may remain in bureaucratic and financial limbo for years, and it may never be fulfilled. Yet, in the event that its ends are not peaceful, it warrants careful monitoring. All source information indicates Iran needs foreign sources of uranium to maintain its nuclear program. How Iran would benefit from any Venezuelan plan to extract uranium will be an open question as long as Venezuela's uranium deposits remain unverified. BROWNFIELD |
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