Los intereses de EE UU en Guinea
Cable de EE UU en el que se identifica a China como el principal competidor en Guinea
El telegrama resalta de nuevo la importancia econ¨®mica del pa¨ªs, sobre todo por sus importantes reservas de petr¨®leo
| ID: | 208194 |
| Date: | 2009-05-21 17:29:00 |
| Origin: | 09MALABO48 |
| Source: | Embassy Malabo |
| Classification: | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY |
| Dunno: | 09MALABO19 |
| Destination: | VZCZCXRO0266 OO RUEHMA DE RUEHMA #0048/01 1411729 ZNR UUUUU ZZH O 211729Z MAY 09 FM AMEMBASSY MALABO TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0499 INFO RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC RHMFIUU/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC RUEHYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE IMMEDIATE 0292 RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 0124 RUEHLC/AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE 0083 RUEHSB/AMEMBASSY HARARE IMMEDIATE 0031 RUEHC/USAID WASHDC RUEHMA/AMEMBASSY MALABO 0570 |
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 MALABO 000048 SENSITIVE SIPDIS HARARE FOR F. CHISHOLM; YAOUNDE FOR DATT LTCOL M. SOUSA E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINR, PHSA, ENRG, EPET, EK, KCOR, ECON, SOCI SUBJECT: EQUATORIAL GUINEA RAW, PAPER 6: REFINING OUR APPROACH REF: MALABO 19, 21, 26, 27, 31 1. (U) Triggered by changes underway in Washington D.C., upcoming personnel rotations in Embassy Malabo and animated by the recent attack on the capital, this is the final in a series of cables intended to update our perspective on Equatorial Guinea, and to provide a ground-level view of one of the world's most-isolated and least-understood countries to interested readers. 2. (SBU) Background: Equatorial Guinea (EG) suffered a brief, brutal colonial period under its fascist Spanish overseers, and then, a generation ago, fell off the cliff with its first elected leader; the paranoid, cruel Macias, who did more proportional harm to the country's already-miserable population than Pol Pot did in Cambodia. The 1979 coup brought changes in leadership and a few improvements, but the country remained extremely poor and isolated until U.S. wildcatters, encouraged by a once-active U.S. Embassy, found commercial quantities of oil and gas offshore in the mid-90s. Sudden riches did nothing to immediately address capacity challenges, and the country's search (and acute need) for a mentor left it disappointed. Given its well-established bad reputation, those who have not focused on EG lately will likely find that it is now bigger than it looks, and better than it sounds. Authoritarian structures are undergoing transformation and the quality of life for average citizens willing to make the effort is improving. The U.S., without the baggage of the former colonialist powers active in the region or the econo-colonialism of the Chinese, is widely looked to by EG to provide a moral compass for this development. The recent change in the U.S. administration -- in the country with the highest per capita density of "Obamas" in the world -- was received as a herald of warmer relations. U.S. involvement is needed to shape EG's future. Relatively minor U.S. technical assistance and advice in key areas (justice, human rights and democracy, social development, education, conservation, maritime security) will be effective in giving EG the future we want it to have. It is time to abandon a moral narrative that has left us with a retrospective bias and an ambivalent approach to one of the most-promising success stories in the region. 3. (SBU) Summary Questions: What do we really want for Equatorial Guinea? Do we want to see the country continue to evolve in positive ways from the very primitive state in which it found itself after independence? Or would we prefer a revolution that brings sudden, uncertain change and unpredictability? The former is clearly the path the country is on, and the latter has potentially dire consequences for our interests, most notably our energy security. 4. (SBU) In the plus column, 1) the government is increasingly populated by young, forward-looking actors, 2) the physical environment and public services are rapidly improving for EG citizens, 3) hundreds of millions of dollars are going into social spending, 4) the government is opening its books in order to obtain membership in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), 5) recent elections showed marked improvement over those in the past, and 6) both skilled and unskilled job opportunities have mushroomed. U.S. engagement can accelerate the positive change already underway. On the other hand, by remaining aloof we cede a fertile field to others (e.g., the Chinese) whose objectives differ from our own while we increase the potential for a sudden shift that might put American lives and interests at risk. Despite recent improvements, it is not difficult to imagine an EG in which U.S. FDI has been nationalized and/or turned over to others to operate, in which Americans are reviled, in which our influence withers. Worse, but imaginable, would be a chaotic change in which the hundreds of Americans here are targeted, billions in U.S. investment destroyed and lost, and -- by virtue of where EG sits on the map -- 20% of our national energy imports threatened. Several scenarios are possible: e.g., metastasis of the Niger Delta troubles, replication of the Gulf of Aden piracy, or "Venezuela-ization" of EG. Our involvement in helping EG improve its security -- particularly maritime security where our MALABO 00000048 002 OF 003 interests so firmly overlap -- and to overcome suspicion of its neighbors, will be crucial to avoid drift in these directions. Moreover, better security will help EG relax its de facto state of martial law and lead to improvements in the area of human rights and democracy. We will only strain bilateral relations with EG if we continue to raise the bar in response to EG efforts and overtures. 5. (SBU) Indeed, EG could be one of the easy ones. It has a compact, relatively homogenous population with very high per capita income levels. It has a stern but mellowing leadership, one clearly trying to atone for past sins, one that is pro-American, and one which is undergoing a positive generational shift away from the authoritarian structures that were its birthright. Meanwhile, the vestiges of those structures serve to maintain one of the safest, most-secure societies in the region. And its requests for help from us (democratization, justice system reform, public finance reform, social development, conservation, security assistance) almost always come with burden-sharing arrangements, and are aimed at gaining our technical assistance and capacity-building expertise. EG is paying its own way. 6. (SBU) As indicated in previous messages, dinosaurs and fossils do remain in EG, and they continue to wield power. However, President Obiang has set a course for integrating EG with the world and, by fits and starts, is moving the country in that direction. Within the current array of alternative leaders, here in Malabo it is not obvious there is anyone else with the vision and influence to see this transformation through. However, Obiang is not a young man. Accelerating positive change while the conditions are right is a job that only the U.S. is positioned to undertake. 7. (SBU) Bigger Than it Looks: Taking away U.S. energy imports from North America (i.e., those from our immediate neighbors Canada and Mexico), we find that over 30% of our imported oil and gas comes from the Gulf of Guinea region -- more, for example, than from the Middle East. The largest portion of the Gulf of Guinea maritime territory belongs to little EG. To ignore the security implications associated with the country at the heart of this key region would leave a gaping hole in the map of our national strategy. Yet, with crypto-sanctions in place and a tiny embassy contingent severely constraining our engagement, that is essentially our policy at the moment. 8. (SBU) A handful of U.S. oil companies have significant investment stakes in EG, not to mention the several hundred American workers they place in the field and the direct energy imports the country's oil fields supply to U.S. markets. Marathon Oil is reported to have around 30% of its capital at risk in EG. Hess' exposure is slightly less. During our extended official absence ('95 to '06), U.S. oil companies painstakingly laid the groundwork for U.S. influence. Impressing Equatoguineans, they built a reputation for Americans of "doing what [we] say, and doing it right" (this is a quote from President Obiang himself). The door is wide open for additional American involvement, both official and private. After all, we (via U.S. oil companies) pay all the bills - and the EG leadership knows it. 9. (SBU) Better Than it Sounds: Yet there is something peculiar about our policy toward EG. The country is certainly no worse than many of our energy allies, and better than some. Given the strategic issues in play, our policy is dangerously indifferent and/or misinformed. From our vantage point here in Malabo, witnessing close-up the yawning capacity gaps and huge distractions EG faces, it is clear we will only solve the problems important to us by engaging -- and yet we refuse to do so despite repeated, open invitations. Our reluctance to become more involved appears to be rooted in our acceptance of a MALABO 00000048 003 OF 003 narrative being supplied by a rapacious diaspora, its co-authors among disaffected Spanish imigris, and oppugnant NGOs who have taken up the story for their own purposes. This storyline is supplied by Equatoguineans who left long ago and who have lost touch with progress here, and/or by Europeans with colonialist perspectives and memories of lost empire. This narrative maintains that Equatoguineans are primitive and ignorant people whose government is a sinister, repressive, blood-thirsty cabal. It suggests that by helping them we would only dirty our hands, because positive change is impossible. However, this embassy can report, based on renewed direct experience in EG, this story is largely fiction -- however accurate parts of it may have been at points in the past. This narrative is no longer a fit guide for our approach toward EG. It is, in fact, so misguided that it is more likely to wreck the relationship. 10. (SBU) A more appropriate guiding narrative comes from our own experience, in which we learned that discrimination -- against people who are culturally different, historically disadvantaged -- is wrong, untenable. EG's hand is not clenched in a fist. It is reaching out for assistance. Our own history has taught us that aiding those who ask for help can heal historical wounds and promote integration. This is the story we must help tell again. We cannot punish a people dealt a bad hand by history simply because they are behind. Money alone does not change this rule. There is a simple calculus at work. There are good guys and bad guys here. We need to strengthen the good guys -- for all his faults, President Obiang among them -- and undercut the bad guys. By doing so, we can help the country succeed. We won't accomplish this by accepting a story contrived by someone else. This is one we will have to write ourselves. SMITH |
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