Detectores de armas nucleares en Espa?a
Cable sobre la importancia de los principales puertos espa?oles
Los puertos de Algeciras, Valencia y Barcelona son esenciales para controlar los contenedores que llegan a Estados Unidos
| ID: | 30292 |
| Date: | 2005-04-07 12:04:00 |
| Origin: | 05MADRID1349 |
| Source: | Embassy Madrid |
| Classification: | SECRET |
| Dunno: | 05STATE60796 |
| Destination: | This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. |
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 MADRID 001349 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/PGI E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2015 TAGS: PTER, PREL, SP, Counterterrorism SUBJECT: GWOT ASSESSMENT: MADRID FEEDBACK REF: STATE 60796 Classified By: Political Counselor Kathy Fitzpatrick; reason 1.4 (b) an d (d) 1. (C) Summary. We appreciate the opportunity to weigh in on issues related to the Global War on Terrorism per reftel action request. Overall, counterterrorism cooperation between the U.S. and Spain is excellent, remaining a cornerstone of the bilateral relationship despite friction on other important issues. There are problems related to information sharing (in both directions) and structural problems within the Spanish counterterrorism security apparatus, but these issues are manageable and are being addressed at several levels. This message does not include new resource requests, but notes that we have to continue our high level of engagement with Spanish authorties in order to develop improved access to counterterrorism information by U.S. investigators. Spain remains a capable partner in the War on Terror and appears willing to further deepen counterterrorism relations with the USG. End Summary. =========================== TERRORISM IN SPAIN =========================== 2. (C) The March 11, 2004 Madrid train bombings made Spain the site of the worst terrorist attack in history against an EU country, but Spain was already an active front in the Global War on Terrorism as a result of its arrest of significant al-Qaida figures beginning in 2001 and its identification of numerous Islamic extremist groups operating within its borders. Since the Madrid train bombings, Spanish authorities have detained over 120 suspected Islamic extremists (including 78 directly related to the train attacks) and derailed terrorist plans to bomb Spain's High Court and other high-profile targets. Terrorist organizations active in Spain include: A. al-Qaida. The trial of Syrian national and al-Qaida financier Barakat Yarkas, who was arrested in November 2001 in connection with the September 11 attacks, is set to begin on April 22. Yarkas has been linked by police to many Islamic extremist suspects who formally belong to other extremist groups listed below. B. Moroccan Islamic Combat Group (GICM). GICM associates were involved in the March 11 attacks, including individuals who were also involved in the Casablanca bombing in Morocco. Moroccan nationals comprise the largest group of North African immigrants in Spain and the majority of suspects arrested in connection with Islamic terrorist cases. C. Salafist Group for Call and Combat. Many Algerian nationals in Spain suspected of involvement in terrorism have links to this organization. D. Armed Islamic Group (GIA). GIA members who eluded the Algerian authorities and fled to Europe were instrumental in recruiting, organizing, and radicalizing young Islamists in Spain. A GIA terrorist who was released early from a Spanish prison due to a clerical error was among the key organizers of the March 11 attacks. E. ETA. Though ETA is in a steep decline as a result of arrests made possible by improved Spanish-French police cooperation and hasn't committed killings in nearly three years, it remains Spain's most important terrorist organization in the eyes of the Spanish public. This is in part because ETA periodically detonates small explosives to demonstrate its continued viability as an armed group, including a recent bombing near a convention where King Juan Carlos was due to appear. Despite press speculation, authorities have not found a link between ETA and Islamic terrorist groups. ============================================= == STRONG COUNTERTERRORISM RELATIONS WITH SPAIN ============================================= == 3. (C) The high level of counterterrorism cooperation between U.S. and Spanish authorities is one of the cornerstones of our bilateral relationship. In addition to high level discussions and exchanges with Spain to discuss counterterrorism activities -- including recent visits to Madrid by Attorney General Ashcroft and Attorney General Gonzales and upcoming visits to Washington by GOS Minister of Interior Alonso and Minister of Justice Aguilar -- we can point to numerous successes in our joint effort to combat terrorism 4. (S) Spanish/USG GWOT successes in Spain include: A. Spain's participation in military operations in Afghanistan, most recently through leadership of a PRT in western Afghanistan and partial-leadership of the FSB in Herat. Spain continues to provide unrestricted access to its military bases at Rota and Moron and blanket flight clearances for U.S. military aircraft, including for GWOT operations. B. Good flow of actionable intelligence information from Embassy Madrid to Spanish security officials, and good reciprocal intelligence sharing by the GOS with USG agencies. Intelligence sharing on terrorism has improved markedly since September 11 and has continued to improve under the Zapatero government. Spanish officials at the highest levels are aware of the USG's level of support for Spanish efforts and President Zapatero recently told the Deputy Secretary that USG information was essential in the dismantlement of several Islamic extremist cells. C. Good flow of information from Spanish police to U.S. law enforcement officials. Much of this information is passed to Legat informally before it becomes part of a sealed judicial case. Examples include information passed to Legat by the Catalonian regional police that helped uncover a Pakistani money transfer and illegal document operation in Barcelona that may have been involved in sending money to significant al-Qaida figures. Another example is the discovery by Spanish officials of correspondence between Spain-based terrorists and terrorists serving prison terms in the U.S. for their involvement in the first World Trade Center bombing in 1992. D. Spain's participation in the Container Security (CSI) and Megaports initiatives. While the Megaports program is moving forward steadily, on CSI we have encountered administrative difficulties and delays on both the U.S. and Spanish sides. However, the fact that approximately 80 percent of containers flowing from the Middle East to U.S. ports pass through Spanish ports makes Spain's participation in these programs at the three major ports of Algeciras, Barcelona, and Valencia essential to U.S. homeland security so we are pressing forward. E. Formation of a Joint Counterterrorism Working Group comprised of U.S. Department of Justice officials, Spanish Ministry of Justice officials, Spanish prosecutors, and terrorism experts from both countries. This responds to Spain's desire for a political symbol of our commitment to work with Spain on counterterrorism issues and to the USG's desire for a joint body to help streamline judicial and investigative cooperation in terrorism cases. Though the Working Group is in its early stages, we hope to use it to strengthen collaboration with Spanish prosecutors on terrorism investigations and increase direct cooperation between U.S. and Spanish counterterrorism investigators. F. Improved cooperation on border security, including on Spain's decision to centralize overseas passport processing. The USG has offered to share electronic visa lookout information on a trial basis and Spanish officials have indicated some interest, though this initiative may be hampered by logistical problems on the Spanish side. The USG has worked with Spanish authorities to help improve their reporting through international and bilateral channels of lost/stolen passports. G. Spain/USG signed bilateral protocol to U.S.-EU Mutual Legal Assistance (MLAT) and Extradition treaties. There is a substantial flow of terrorism-related MLAT requests in each direction. For example, Spanish authorities were extremely responsive in a U.S. MLAT request for information regarding the prosecution of Zacarias Moussaoui. H. Good cooperation on terrorism financing cases. Spanish authorities make asset checks according to our terrorist financing notifications and work to prevent the illegal use of the Spanish banking system. Spain works with the USG in international organizations such as FATF to strengthen international terrorism financing regimes. Spain continues to upgrade its asset search systems and will soon implement one of Europe's toughest anti-terorrism financing laws allowing preventive and administrative freezing of assets. ============================================= BUT PROBLEMS REMAIN ON INFORMATION SHARING ============================================= 5. (S) Information sharing for lead purposes between U.S. and Spanish police and security services is working well, but there are significant difficulties in sharing U.S. intelligence information with Spanish courts since such information cannot be protected from public disclosure. USG delays and denials on requests for access to intelligence information and witnesses for judicial purposes have generated friction with Spanish judges, particularly high-profile magistrate judges Baltazar Garzon and Juan del Olmo. U.S. Department of Justice, Embassy, and Legat officials are engaged in an ongoing dialogue with Spanish judges and judicial officials on the controls each government has in place to prevent the release of shared intelligence information. 6. (S) For different reasons, USG law enforcement authorities sometimes have difficulty obtaining responses to official requests for information on terrorism cases, particularly information pertaining to ongoing judicial investigations in Spain. Under the Spanish system, once a judge is assigned to a case, that judge exercises control over the investigation and has sole authority over dissemination of official information related to the investigation. Judges, who operate with substantial independence, may permit Spanish police to share information for lead purposes on an unofficial basis. However, judges sometimes deny access to investigative information citing judicial secrecy provisions that cannot be overriden by other Spanish authorities. Legat and the Consular Section work closely with Spanish judges and prosecutors to avoid such logjams, but judicial secrecy remains an impediment to the USG's access to important sources of information related to international counterterrorism and counterintelligence investigations. ============================================= ============== STRUCTURAL WEAKNESSES IN SPAIN'S COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS ============================================= ============== 7. (S) Though Spain has an impressive counterterrorism apparatus, there are structural problems that continue to hamper its law enforcement efforts: A. Most important is the lack of cooperation and coordination among Spanish law enforcement and intelligence agencies. There is a tradition of intense inter-service rivalry between the CNI (the intelligence service), the Civil Guard, and the National Police, all of which play a significant role in counterterrorism operations. There is an added layer of conflict between the national security services and regional police, especially with the Basque Regional police. By all accounts, the CNCA (the national counterterrorism center) launched in 2004 has failed to improve information sharing and coordination among the national services. The USG has worked with Spanish authorities to improve internal collaboration, for example by providing only one "CODIS" DNA database instead of the separate databases requested by the various services. We are also encouraging the GOS to look at ways other countries have found to better integrate their security agencies to combat terrorism. B. Spanish authorities excel at disrupting terrorist organizations, but have much more difficulty in achieving convictions. This is due in part to Spanish laws enacted during the democratic transition -- and intended to overcome the abuses of the Franco era -- that provide substantial rights to defendants and significantly impact the ability of prosecutors to win cases and/or obtain strong prison terms for convicted terrorists. There are also problems related to the ability of Spanish authorities to obtain strong evidence for judicial purposes, in part because security agencies are reluctant to release information that would reveal sources and methods. Police sources have also indicated that they have sometimes been required to carry out arrests prematurely in response to political pressure to demonstrate strong actions against terrorism. Another important factor is the understandable desire of Spanish officials to prevent any new attacks similar to the March 11 bombings, so there is a predisposition to act preventively, even where legal cases have not been fully prepared. One result of this has been that of the 117 Islamic extremists in Spanish jails at the end of 2004, 103 were being held in "preventive detention" rather than on specific charges related to a terrorist attack or plot. C. Finally, the Spanish public remains fixated on ETA as Spain's primary security threat. Despite clear evidence of a large and growing Islamic extremist presence in Spain (a fact of which the Spanish authorities are very aware) and the devastating Madrid train bombings, polls consistently indicate that Spanish citizens consider ETA to be a greater danger than jihadist groups. While Spanish police have tripled the number of investigators working against Islamic extremist groups, they face public and political pressure to use their resources to focus on putting an end to ETA's long-running campaign against the Spanish state. There is also a question of mindset, with Spanish security officials realizing that they have some distance to go in becoming as proficient against Islamic radicals as they are against ETA, which operates within an ideological context that is far more familiar to Spanish investigators. ================= COMMENT ================= 8. (C) Spain is a capable and willing ally in the Global War on Terrorism. While we do not see a need for signficant new resources for counterterrorism cooperation with Spain, we do need to find ways to improve our existing channels of communication and to better understand each other's judicial systems. In the case of ETA, the Spanish government showed considerable adaptability in confronting the threat. We believe the GOS will show the same level of flexibility in dealing with Islamic extremists and that the USG is well placed to provide analytical, technical, and judicial assistance when it could be useful to Spanish authorities. MANZANARES |
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