La gran filtraci¨®n | Ir¨¢n
Cable sobre la preparaci¨®n de la visita del coordinador antiterrorista a Emiratos ?rabes Unidos
En 2006 la embajada de EE UU en Abu Dhabi hace un an¨¢lisis de la posici¨®n de ese pa¨ªs respecto a todos los asuntos relacionados con la lucha antiterrorista, entre los que se incluye Ir¨¢n
| ID: | 62314 |
| Date: | 2006-04-29 13:15:00 |
| Origin: | 06ABUDHABI1725 |
| Source: | Embassy Abu Dhabi |
| Classification: | SECRET//NOFORN |
| Dunno: | 05ABUDHABI3243 05ABUDHABI3565 06ABUDHABI1123 06ABUDHABI1228 06ABUDHABI1422 06ABUDHABI1520 06ABUDHABI1716 06ABUDHABI1724 06ABUDHABI176 06ABUDHABI248 06ABUDHABI409 06ABUDHABI605 06ABUDHABI779 06ABUDHABI909 |
| Destination: | This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. |
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ABU DHABI 001725 SIPDIS NOFORN STATE FOR S/CT - AMBASSADOR CRUMPTON E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/28/2016 TAGS: PTER, PINS, ASEC, EPET, MCAP, IR, IZ, AE, Terrorism SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR COUNTERTERRORISM COORDINATOR CRUMPTON'S VISIT TO THE UAE REF: A. 05 ABU DHABI 3243 B. 05 ABU DHABI 3565 C. ABU DHABI 409 D. ABU DHABI 779 E. ABU DHABI 1228 F. ABU DHABI 248 (NOTAL) G. ABU DHABI 176 H. ABU DHABI 605 I. USDEL 00007 J. ABU DHABI 1123 K. ABU DHABI 909 (NOTAL) L. ABU DHABI 1520 M. ABU DHABI 1716 N. ABU DHABI 1422 O. ABU DHABI 1724 Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 1. (S) Summary. Embassy Abu Dhabi looks forward to welcoming you to the UAE on May 7. U.S. and UAE officials have had a number of productive meetings on the topic of counterterrorism, the most recent of which came on April 22, when Fran Townsend, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, met over lunch with Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ) and his brother, Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed (AbZ). Your visit builds on our ongoing dialogue and efforts to push the UAE on several areas of interest to the USG: counterterrorism, counter terror finance, Iran, Hamas, Iraq, and ideological extremism (each is covered in the scenesetter). We have requested separate meetings with Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed (AbZ), whom you met in New York last September, and State Security Director Sheikh Hazza bin Zayed, whom Deputy Coordinator Urbancic met last October. In your meetings, you should commend the UAE for its assistance and cooperation, including its strong condemnation of the April 24 bomb attack in Dahab. The UAE remains a committed partner in the global war on terror, but it continues to take an ad hoc approach to countering terrorism that "solves" the problem for the UAE locally, but fails to contribute on a transnational basis. In January, the U.S. and the UAE held the first meeting of the Joint Terrorist Finance Coordinating Committee (JTFCC). Treasury U/S Levey is currently in the UAE to hold a second meeting that will focus on cash couriers and charities. 2. (S) Although the UAE regards Iran as one of its most serious threats to national security, UAE officials are reluctant to take actions that could provoke their neighbor and compromise their extensive trading relationship. At the same time, we are seeing more of a willingness on the part of the UAE to support USG initiatives without the full approval of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). As tensions escalate between Iran and the international community, the UAE is growing increasingly nervous. The UAE leadership, which has told us they consider Hamas a terrorist organization, plans to uphold its previous commitments of humanitarian assistance to the Palestinian people. The UAE has taken an active role in encouraging Sunni participation in the Iraqi political process and continues to condemn the sectarian violence that is preventing stabilization of the country. In the face of growing ideological extremism in the Gulf, the UAE leadership is politically determined not to allow Islamist extremists to gain a foothold on UAE soil. End Summary. Counterterrorism Efforts ------------------------ 3. (S) The UAE is concerned about the terrorist threat to the UAE, but lacks a comprehensive implementation strategy for reducing its vulnerability (ref A). The UAE considers homeland security one of its top priorities, but rather than prioritizing national security projects, its efforts have focused on contracting risk assessments, forming committees, and procuring equipment. In your meetings, we recommend that you inquire about the government's plan, announced by President Khalifa in December 2005, to place all the security agencies under a newly established National Security Council. MbZ, asked by Townsend if the UAE was worried about its oil infrastructure, responded emphatically, "absolutely." He told Townsend that there are three international companies currently conducting risk assessments of the UAE oil infrastructure and maritime security for the UAEG. Townsend offered U.S. assistance in helping the UAE to reduce its vulnerability (ref O). 4. (S) The UAEG reacts quickly when presented with evidence of a terrorist presence inside the UAE, but does not approach the problem from a transnational posture. The UAE's immediate response when terrorists pose a risk is to deport them. UAE agencies do not investigate fully to see how far the problem goes or whether there is an international network involved. Although the U.S./UAE counterterrorism cooperation is strong (with the UAE working closely with the USG on specific cases), Emiratis do not consistently share lead information found in the possession of individuals in their custody with each other or with the U.S. Government. These tactics limit law enforcement and intelligence services' ability to use intelligence to disrupt extremist cells and planned attacks. The UAE's insistence on deportation as a solution does not protect the country long-term or truly address the nature and scope of the problem. Townsend discussed this matter with MbZ and urged the UAE to instead to fully investigate terror suspects and share the results of those inquiries with the USG. Counterterrorism Finance ------------------------ 5. (S) The UAE has made significant strides in regulating the financial sector against money laundering and terrorist financing (ref B). Although the UAE now has a strong legal framework in place, it must turn its efforts to enforcement. It is imperative that UAE authorities investigate and prosecute violators of terror finance/anti-money laundering, cash courier, and charity laws and regulations. To date, investigation and prosecution have been weak. In an effort to increase U.S. and UAE cooperation on terrorist financing, the first meeting of the U.S/UAE Joint Terrorist Finance Coordinating Committee (JTFCC) was held in Abu Dhabi on January 24, 2005 (ref C). The UAE team had representatives from the Central Bank, State Security, Ministries of Interior, Foreign Affairs, and Justice. However, no one participated from Dubai. In order for the JTFCC to be an effective committee, Dubai's Police, State Security, Customs, and the Department of Islamic Affairs and Charities must participate. The April 30 meeting will focus on cash couriers and charity regulations. Iran ---- 6. (S/NF) UAE leaders are very concerned about escalating tensions between Iran and the international community. AbZ publicly expressed his country's concern, and the entire region's "vulnerability," at a press conference in Kuwait April 25, while urging a peaceful resolution (ref M). Commercial ties between Dubai and Iran are significant (Dubai is Iran's largest non-oil trading partner), and as a result the UAEG walks a fine line between maintaining and encouraging this trade and working to prevent suspected Iranian proliferation activities. Although the UAEG is worried about Iran's nuclear ambitions, its short-term policy decisions regarding Iran center on not provoking its neighbor. The USG has approached the UAEG four times since January, asking it to interdict and inspect cargo suspected of going to Iran's nuclear and/or missile programs. None of those instances has resulted in a successful interdiction. In the first two instances UAE officials simply refused to take action (refs F and G). The Director of Dubai's State Security Organization explained during the 11 February U.S./UAE Counterproliferation Task Force meeting that the decision not to inspect the containers had been a political decision based on the UAE's concern that Iran might retaliate (ref H). In the two later instances (ref K), ships that had been scheduled to arrive in Dubai went directly to Bandar Abbas. AbZ told U/S Joseph during his April 8 visit to Abu Dhabi that the USG should approach the UAE on interdiction requests "only as a last resort" (ref N). Two weeks later, he assured Townsend that the UAEG does not want Iran to take advantage of the UAE's open trading environment. He said the UAE was in the final stages of ratifying its export control law and that it would be announced "soon." In an encouraging development, the UAE on April 15 privately endorsed the Proliferation Security Initiative's Statement of Interdiction Principles (ref L). 7. (S) In recent meetings with senior USG officials, Abu Dhabi's ruling family has expressed clear support for U.S. initiatives against Iran. The U.S. and UAE have a "common desire to succeed," AbZ told U/S Joseph, noting that the combination of Iran and terrorism is something that cannot be tolerated. "The threat from al-Qa'ida would be minor if Iran has nukes," AbZ said (ref N). MbZ told Townsend April 22 that the Iranians think that the U.S. will not do anything about their recent declaration that they have successfully enriched uranium. He added that he thought the Iranians were wrong. MbZ and UAE Vice President and Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid agreed with Secretary Rice February 23 about the need to counter Iran's growing influence in the region and its nuclear ambitions, although they specified that any sanctions should target the key Iranian leadership, not the Iranian people (ref I). MbZ told A/S Welch March 28 that he did not think it was necessary to wait for all Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries to agree before proceeding with any U.S. plans against Iran (ref E). He told A/S Welch that the UAE would prepare a paper responding to USG concerns about Iran and mechanisms for addressing the challenge posed by Iran. In a March 27 meeting with CENTCOM Commander General Abizaid, MbZ spoke about the Iranian threat with a greater sense of urgency. He was strongly in favor of taking action against Iran and its president sooner rather than later. "I believe this guy is going to take us to war. ... It's a matter of time," MbZ warned, adding that action against Iran and President Ahmedinejad should be taken this year or next year. 8. (S/NF) SSD Director Hazza told A/S Welch March 29 that the Ayatollah Ali Khameini had once issued a fatwa prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons by Iran, but noted that this should not be considered a guarantee. Hazza assessed that Iran is also a threat due to its ties to international terrorist organizations, including al-Qaida, as well as their financial support to Hamas. He added that the relationship between Iran and Syria, and their links to Hizballah, was also of concern, as was Iran's attempts to expand its influence in Iraq and elsewhere in the world. MbZ also expressed to A/S Welch March 28 the concern that Hizballah was supporting Hamas. During your meetings, you should explain the graduated approach to addressing Iran in the United Nations Security Council and encourage the UAE to isolate Iran--regardless of potential economic backlash. You should also explain the importance of the UAE working closely with the USG on interdiction requests. These meetings will be a good follow-on to the discussion U/S Joseph had with AbZ April 8, when Joseph outlined the USG's policy priorities for Iran. (Note: While AbZ, like MbZ, expressed support for U.S. initiatives against Iran, he stated that the USG should come to the UAE as a "very last resort. ... If you can solve something without involving the UAE, please do so." End Note.) Palestinian Territories/Hamas ----------------------------- 9. (S) UAE leaders have told us that they consider Hamas a terrorist organization and that they would not fund Hamas unless they denounce violence (refs D and E). However, after Hamas political chief Khaled Meshaal visited Abu Dhabi on March 22 and met with UAE Minister of Presidential Affairs Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed al-Nahyan and Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Mohammed al-Sha'ali, Meshaal publicly claimed that the UAEG had pledged to continue to provide financial assistance to the Hamas-led Palestinian Authority (ref J). MbZ told A/S Welch March 28 that the UAEG allowed Meshaal to come, but that "officially, we don't recognize Khaled Meshaal." MbZ said that once a new Palestinian Prime Minister is selected, UAEG officials will travel to the Palestinian territories to ascertain that UAEG assistance is "going to the right people." In his meeting with Townsend, MbZ said that the UAE "felt the Muslim Brotherhood rally behind Hamas" after its electoral victory in the Palestinian territories, and that the Hamas victory should be a lesson to the West. UAE Vice President and Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid sounded a note of optimism when he told Secretary Rice February 23 that Hamas, "with some pressure," SIPDIS would understand the need to respect the will of the international community. 10. (S) The UAE has historically provided significant financial assistance to the Palestinian people. Typically, the UAE sends aid to the Palestinian territories through charity organizations, or by projectized assistance; but the UAEG has also provided financial assistance directly to the Palestinian Authority, most recently $20 million in March 2006 to Mahmoud Abbas for salaries. In the wake of the Hamas electoral victory, UAE leaders told us they intend to honor their previous commitments of humanitarian assistance (including the $100 million Sheikh Khalifa housing complex that was announced last year). 11. (S/NF) In his meeting with A/S Welch March 29, SSD Director Hazza assessed that there was both a positive and a negative side to the Hamas election win. On the negative side, he cited Hamas' position with regard to Israel, and their violent agenda. On the positive side, Hazza noted the fact that Hamas was now in power and was accountable to the international community. He spoke to A/S Welch of the threat posed by the Muslim Brotherhood. Hazza also asked A/S Welch how the USG would react to those countries that did support the Hamas government, and whether they would run afoul of U.S. laws restricting support to terrorist organizations. A/S Welch replied that that would be a problem, emphasizing that no money should go to the government unless Hamas renounced violence and accepted Israel. A/S Welch also told Hazza that it was not the responsibility of the U.S. or other Arab countries to pay the salaries of the new Hamas government, underscoring the need for Hamas to show accountability. MbZ told A/S Welch that Hamas benefited from "official and private contributions" from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar. MbZ said it was "easy to take $1 million in a suitcase" to Lebanon, alluding to cash couriers. Iraq ---- 12. (S/NF) A partner in the war on terror, the UAE continues to provide U.S. forces access, overflight clearances, and other critical logistical assistance to Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom. The UAE has also been a helpful supporter of Iraq's burgeoning political process. It has worked with Iraqi political and religious figures to encourage greater Sunni integration, and it has consulted with Ambassador Khalilzad on a number of occasions about the need to stem sectarianism in Iraq. The UAE has publicly condemned acts of sectarian and terrorist violence in Iraq, most recently, the February 22 bombing of the al-Askariya Shrine. MbZ told Townsend that he had "no confidence" in the new Iraqi Prime Minister-designate, Jawad al-Maliki, and he reiterated his concern about Iran's meddling in Iraq's internal affairs. He has pledged the UAE's support to the fight against al-Qaida. Ideological Extremism --------------------- 13. (S) The Abu Dhabi ruling family continue to be outspoken on the issue of Muslim extremists and the threat they pose to the region. MbZ told Townsend that if there were an election in Dubai tomorrow, the Muslim Brotherhood would take over. He said the challenge is to find a way to remove the extremists in a way that they never come back. One way he and his brothers have been trying to accomplish this is by reforming the education system, which they say was penetrated by the Muslim Brotherhood in the late 1960s. (Note: The UAE has announced that half of the members of the Federal National Council would be elected while half would continue to be appointed by the rulers of the various emirates. Despite this announcement, the UAE still lags behind other Gulf states in terms of democratization. End Note.) UAE officials publicly and strongly condemn extremism and terrorist attacks, anti-extremism has been the focus of government-approved Friday sermons in the mosques. SISON |
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