Cambios en el r¨¦gimen cubano
Cable en el que Bernardino Le¨®n se re¨²ne con un alto cargo de EE UU para Am¨¦rica Latina
El funcionario espa?ol tranquiliza a Arturo Valenzuela: no habr¨¢ un gran cambio en la pol¨ªtica espa?ola hacia Cuba
| ID: | 249424 |
| Date: | 2010-02-18 16:11:00 |
| Origin: | 10MADRID187 |
| Source: | Embassy Madrid |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Dunno: | 10MADRID87 |
| Destination: | VZCZCXRO6924 PP RUEHAO RUEHRS DE RUEHMD #0187/01 0491611 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 181611Z FEB 10 FM AMEMBASSY MADRID TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1964 INFO RUEHWH/WEST HEMIS AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY |
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MADRID 000187 SIPDIS JUAN GONZALEZ, WHA BILL MCILHENNY, WHA/PPC ALEXANDRA MCKNIGHT AND STACIE ZERDECKI, EUR/WE E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/09/2020 TAGS: PREL, PGOV, CU, SP SUBJECT: A/S VALENZUELA DISCUSSES LATIN AMERICA WITH BERNARDINO LEON REF: MADRID 87 Classified By: DCM Arnold A. Chacon, for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 1. (C) SUMMARY: During an excellent and extremely cordial meeting that lasted over two hours on February 1, WHA Assistant Secretary Arturo Valenzuela and NSA-equivalent Bernardino Leon, Secretary General of the Office of the Presidency, discussed prospects for U.S.-Spanish cooperation in Latin America and Spanish priorities in the region during its rotating presidency of the Council of Europe. The two discussed recent efforts in Haiti, ongoing European trade ties with the region, threats to democracy in Venezuela and Nicaragua, and human rights in Cuba. The first GOS interlocutor to meet with Valenzuela during his February 1-3 visit to Madrid, Leon received Valenzuela warmly, saying Valenzuela had "many friends" and admitting that he had wanted to meet Valenzuela for a long time. END SUMMARY. 2. (C) Leon spoke of President Zapatero's busy agenda including trips to Davos and Ethiopia and his visit to Washington, DC, for the February 4 National Prayer Breakfast. Reviewing the themes of Spain's EU Presidency, Leon said Zapatero hoped the May 2010 EU-Latin America Summit would "transform" the economic relationship between Europe and the region and he spoke of efforts to negotiate a number of trade agreements and to bring closure to the EU's pact with Central America. Regarding the Andean agreement, he said Ecuador hoped for a more bilateral agreement and he described Bolivia as a very difficult case, due to the coincidence of a lack of experience in trade negotiations combined with a lack of technical expertise in government. There had been no action to support "expressions of will" from MERCOSUR. Regarding Argentina in general, Leon told Valenzuela he shared his exact frustrations -- but agreed they would need five days to discuss. //CUBA// 3. (C) Regarding Spain's reported lobbying to replace the EU's Common Position toward Cuba, Leon cautioned Valenzuela not to believe everything he read in the press. Leon did not foresee a huge change in EU policy toward the island. He was careful to clarify statements by Secretary of State for IberoAmerica Juan Pablo de Laiglesia (with whom Valenzuela met later on February 1) as referencing a "internal reflection" and brainstorming within the EU about a path to democratic change. President Zapatero had never met either of the Castros and would not visit Cuba without progress as yet unseen (and certainly not within the next six months). Leon frankly acknowledged the perceived daylight between the Spanish presidency and MFA on Cuba policy, and indicated that FM Moratinos appeared to be applying his pro-active Middle East diplomatic experience to the Cuban scenario. Leon admitted Spain's current relationship with Cuba was "difficult" in part because the GOS had had ties to former FM Perez-Roque and also because the GOC interpreted Spain's Historic Memory Law (by which hundreds of thousands of descendants of exiled Spanish citizens are expected to claim Spanish nationality) as a stroke of the pen directed at Cuba. 4. (C) The two discussed how to bring about democratic reform in Cuba, with Leon specifying he was the highest-level Spanish official to have met with the most important dissidents. Referring to Cuba's economy and comparing the present crisis to Eastern Europe prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall, Leon speculated that offers of economic engagement on agricultural and energy issues of great interest of the Cuban regime might lead Cuba to accept certain conditions. 5. (C) Valenzuela explained that while U.S. policy toward Cuba was governed by law, President Obama's intention was to press forward in engaging the GOC on issues of mutual interest and concern. He cited the coordinated response to the January 12 earthquake in Haiti as an opportunity to cooperate with Cuba. The USG has offered to provide medical supplies to 400 Cuban doctors currently providing care in Haiti. Even so, USG support for human rights in Cuba was paramount in our approach and policy. //HAITI// 6. (C) Both agreed on the importance of following up the Montreal meeting and the need to triangulate assistance. MADRID 00000187 002 OF 003 Leon raised the possibility of funneling half of all reconstruction aid through the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), rather than via the World Bank. Valenzuela stressed the need for long-term coordination of financial contributions beyond the initial emergency and stabilization phases. Leon argued the IADB had a greater stake in Haiti and more regional experience and would be in a better position to manage the donors' trust fund in the event the World Bank is called to respond to a respond to a future disaster elsewhere in the world. Leon observed that offering the IADB a leading role would not prevent the WB from making a contribution, and held that WB President Bob Zoellick would understand the need to include Latin America. Valenzuela seconded the argument for regional control and urged that the United Nations not leave Latin America out of the assistance and peacekeeping equation. Involving the IADB would help increase Latin buy-in. Leon said he was "completely in agreement" with Valenzuela about holding future aid coordination meetings in New York without putting all eggs in the UN basket. //HONDURAS// 7. (C) Leon predicted normalization of Honduras's relations with the international community was on the horizon, and agreed with Valenzuela that the situation was improving, saying things were on the right track. He described the challenge of getting Honduras closer to more stable states in the region in order to shore up its fragile institutions. Leon shared Valenzuela,s frustration and concern over Brazil's incomprehensible position. Valenzuela urged strong Spanish and EU support for President Lobo's new government, noting that the election itself was not a sufficient solution, but part of a collaborative process to ensure a healthy Honduras. Lobo's agenda, while not easy, included worthy goals to combat poverty and Honduras's other problems. //NICARAGUA// 8. (C) Leon stressed the need to strengthen political institutions in the lead up to elections, calling Nicaragua an opportunity for U.S.-Spanish-Brazilian cooperation, especially during the last months of President Lula's term. He noted former President Aleman was "frustrated" with President Daniel Ortega and speculated about the political prospects for Eduardo Montealegre as a result. Everyone agreed Ortega was erratic and unpredictable and Leon noted Ortega was the only president in the region (other than Castro) with whom President Zapatero had refused to meet, had not and would not receive. //VENEZUELA// 9. (C) Leon observed the situation in Venezuela was getting more and more complicated. He suggested the international community should worry less about Chavez and focus more on supporting the democratic opposition. He expressed hope for the "real possibility" that a majority of Venezuelan public opinion would turn against Chavez. He also shared his view that Chavez would do something to further harm his own cause if he perceived he would lose upcoming elections. Valenzuela said chavismo was more a symptom than the cause of fragility of institutions. He expressed frustration that the opposition had not necessarily been constructive. Valenzuela stressed the importance of discussing Venezuela with other countries, urging a more pro-active approach on the part of all countries that would be more constructive than confronting Chavez or "playing his game." Leon observed recent elections had gone better but shared U.S. concerns about Venezuela's growing ties with Iran (admitting the EU should have done more to intercede) and about restrictions on Venezuelan broadcasters. Leon indicated that EU ambassadors had plans to meet with Chavez to make it clear that the closures were unacceptable and unconstitutional. He said it was harder to talk to Chavez now than previously. //BOLIVIA// 10. (C) Elsewhere in the Andean region, despite the similarities in political situations and problems, the reasons for each country's difficulties were very different, making it impossible to put all the countries "in one basket" or to equate Chavez with Morales, for example. On Bolivia, Valenzuela said Spain was in a position to promote cooperation on counter-narcotics and in other areas where the MADRID 00000187 003 OF 003 United States had been shut out. Leon noted the "unimaginable" political success of President Morales left no alternative but to focus on the most important themes. He acknowledged the GOS had seen Bolivia respond well in specific areas, including intelligence sharing, hydrocarbons, and protections for foreign oil and gas companies against exploitation. Valenzuela underscored the need to "multi-lateralize" cooperation and coordination on combating narco-trafficking to include Brazil and Europe, which were more directly affected by the Bolivian drug trade than the United States, where demand had remained stable or declined. 11. (C) Leon assured Valenzuela that the United States would have Spain,s support, especially during its EU presidency, saying Spain knew who to talk to in Bolivia and noting that Morales respected President Zapatero, with whom he had gone jogging in Central Park in September 2009. Leon suggested that Valenzuela touch base with Spain,s Ministry of Interior, which had the most historical contact with Bolivian interlocutors based on bilateral cooperation to fight the Basque terrorist organization ETA. Leon held that Morales was both more sophisticated than Chavez, had enough support to keep governing, and would not allow himself to be manipulated by anyone. 12. (U) Assistant Secretary Valenzuela cleared this message. CHACON |
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