Juegos Ol¨ªmpicos de R¨ªo
Cable de la embajada sobre la estructura del Ministerio de Exteriores de Brasil
La Embajada de EE UU analiza el funcionamiento de la canciller¨ªa brasile?a y la dificultad de bregar con una c¨²pula con varias cabezas y muy "ideologizada"
| ID: | 191611 |
| Date: | 2009-02-11 19:28:00 |
| Origin: | 09BRASILIA177 |
| Source: | Embassy Brasilia |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Dunno: | 08BRASILIA1418 08BRASILIA1636 08BRASILIA1637 08BRASILIA1638 08RIODEJANEIRO236 08SAOPAULO497 08STATE115233 09BRASILIA103 09BRASILIA68 |
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BRASILIA 000177 SIPDIS STATE FOR WHA, IIP E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2019 TAGS: PREL, PGOV, ECON, OIIP, BR SUBJECT: UNDERSTANDING BRAZIL'S FOREIGN MINISTRY, PART 1: IDEOLOGICAL FORCES REF: A. 2008 SAO PAULO 497 B. 2008 RIO DE JANEIRO 236 C. 2008 BRASILIA 1636 D. 2008 BRASILIA 1637 E. 2008 BRASILIA 1638 F. 2008 BRASILIA 1418 G. BRASILIA 103 H. BRASILIA 0068 I. 2008 STATE 115233 Classified By: Ambassador Clifford M. Sobel, Reason 1.4 (b) and (d) 1. (C) Summary. As Brazil takes an increasingly prominent place on the international stage, its Foreign Ministry, known widely as Itamaraty after its headquarters building, finds itself under the influence of four powerful personalities whose ideologies are shaping its foreign policy priorities and interaction with the United States. Over the last six years, President Lula's relatively pragmatic effort to expand Brazil's outreach to a growing group of countries, including the United States, has been implemented differently by the GOB's three principal foreign policy actors: the nationalist Foreign Minister Celso Amorim, the anti-American Secretary General (deputy Foreign Minister) Samuel Pinheiro Guimaraes, and the academic leftist presidential Foreign Policy Advisor Marco Aurelio Garcia. Along with President Lula, the three have pulled the Foreign Ministry in unaccustomed and sometimes different directions. 2. (C) The departure of deputy FM Guimaraes in November 2009 and a new administration in January 2011 are likely to again modify the GOB's foreign policy ideologies and priorities. As we seek to broaden and deepen our relationship with Itamaraty, ideological dynamics will make Itamaraty a sometimes frustrating partner. Even so, the opportunity exists now to move forward by working with other Brazilian institutions, and to shape the views of a large cohort of younger, more pragmatic, and more globally oriented diplomats who will be moving into senior ranks. Para 16 contains two proposals post is actively exploring. (Note: This is the first of three cables examining the influences on Brazil's Foreign Ministry. A second will report on the institutional strains affecting Itamaraty. A third will examine the inter-agency struggles that are slowly eroding Itamaraty's foreign policy primacy; see also paras 13-14 below. End note.) End summary. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - President Lula: The Pragmatic Leftist - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 3. (C) President Lula arrived in office in 2003 with little foreign affairs experience and a broadly leftist approach to international affairs in which more developed countries stood against less developed countries on the world stage. In practice, however, Lula has demonstrated a gift for personalizing foreign policy through contacts with foreign leaders and a penchant for taking a pragmatic rather than an ideological approach to working with other countries. As a result, Lula has significantly shaped Brazil's foreign policy efforts, as his good working relationships with leaders from across the political spectrum have helped increase Brazilian influence and standing, while paving the way for closer cooperation between Brazil and a growing number of global actors, including the United States. But there remains a notable tension between Lula's actions and his rhetoric, which often takes on a North-South, "us versus them" cast. This tension keeps Itamaraty on edge, and has opened the door for Amorim, Guimaraes, and Garcia to formulate and implement Brazil's foreign policy in different ways. BRASILIA 00000177 002 OF 005 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 'Three Foreign Ministers' Make for Unhappy Diplomats - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 4. (C) Most analysts agree that Lula is not the principal architect of his administration's foreign policy vision, nor the principal overseer of its implementation. In this regard, contacts almost universally cite FM Amorim, SG Guimaraes, and Advisor Garcia as nearly co-equal with regard to their influence in determining the broad outlines and scope of Brazil's foreign policy. All three are leftist in their basic ideology, but each has taken on a specific leadership role, approaches his job with a different slant, relates in a different manner to President Lula, and receives support from a different base. Each has carved out his own foreign policy niche: trade, developed country relations, multilateral issues, Africa, and the Middle East for Amorim; political-military issues, relations with some developing countries, and Foreign Ministry inner workings for Guimaraes; and South American and leftist countries in Latin America and elsewhere for Garcia. The effect is a somewhat disjointed vision and implementation of Brazil's foreign policy that can lead to frustration on the part of Brazilian diplomats. 5. (C) Where the interests of these three advisors coincide in their views, Brazil's direction has been unequivocal: prioritizing regional political integration, deepening relations with emerging economies (e.g., through the BRICs and IBSA--India, Brazil, South Africa--fora), expanding south-south relations (e.g., through Arab States-South America, South America-Africa, and Latin America-wide fora), and increasing dialogue with other regional powers (Iran, Venezuela, China, North Korea) to highlight its position as a friend of both the United States and its adversaries. None of the three admits that there is any interest or effort to place relations with Europe and the United States on a second plane, and staffing at Brazil's foreign missions seems to bear this out (see septel). However, there is a growing debate among the non-government foreign policy elite in Brazil (refs A and B), and substantial opposition from the private sector, regarding the wisdom of what is widely acknowledged as a heavy south-south focus. This debate expresses publicly the discomfort that many diplomats express privately with the direction of Brazil's foreign policy under Lula. Diplomats tell us that the leftist slant to policy has resulted in "exile" either overseas or to domestic postings outside Itamaraty (at universities, for example), self-exile overseas, or early retirement for more senior colleagues. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - FM Amorim: the Nationalist Leftist - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 6. (C) For all the sniping at Lula's foreign policy from senior ex-diplomats--and such criticism is constant, public, and widespread--Foreign Minister Amorim is one of their own, a respected career diplomat steeped in traditional Itamaraty nationalism. Historically, this expressed itself in opposition to the United States, and it is still unquestionably true that, within South America, Itamaraty resists almost without exception regional initiatives involving the United States. When the United States is at the table, in Itamaraty's view, Brazil cannot lead. This may explain why Itamaraty remains lukewarm regarding the Summit of the Americas, has rejected cooperation with us in South America on biofuels, and has launched a number of initiatives in South America that do not include the United States. Most recently, the December 2008 Bahia summits (refs C, D, E), including the first-ever meeting of Latin American and Caribbean heads of state and government, represented an effort by Brazil to expand the scope of its leadership in the BRASILIA 00000177 003 OF 005 region, without having to play second fiddle to the United States. 7. (C) Under Amorim's most recent tenure as Foreign Minister, however, Itamaraty nationalism has undergone a subtle shift. (Note: Amorim also served as FM for 18 months under President Itamar Franco, 1993-1994. He has served as FM under Lula since 2003. End note.) Over the last several years, a broader, once nearly knee-jerk anti-Americanism has given way to a growing desire to have a seat among global players addressing global issues, to be and be perceived as being an equal to Europe, China, India, Japan, and the United States on the world stage (ref F). The most notable expressions of this tendency have been the renewed primacy given Itamaraty's long-standing effort to secure a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, a constructive and engaged role in the WTO negotiations (under pressure from Brazil's private sector), interest in playing in the Middle East peace process, and most recently active engagement in discussions on the global financial crisis. Compared with Guimaraes and Garcia, Amorim's leftist views tend to be held in check by traditional Itamaraty care for diplomatic niceties and an almost reverential respect for reciprocity and multilateralism. Brazil's recent decision to grant refugee status to an Italian terrorist (ref G), for example, was clearly made by the Justice Minister for ideological reasons, and almost certainly without Amorim's support. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Secretary General Guimaraes: the Anti-American Leftist - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 8. (C) One former diplomat told PolCouns that SG Guimaraes, a career diplomat who was shunted aside by President Cardoso, owes his influence and independence to being the Labor Party's (PT) first choice for FM after Lula was elected. Guimaraes believed he was not confirmable and suggested Amorim, with himself as Secretary General--a move the PT made, but which required congress to pass a waiver, as Guimaraes had not served as ambassador, a legal requirement to hold the post. Along with family connections (Guimaraes' daughter is married to Amorim's son), this history may explain his outsized authority and substantial autonomy. 9. (C) Guimaraes is virulently anti-American, and anti-"first world" in general. He has advocated extreme positions--for example, that in order to be taken seriously on the world stage Brazil must develop nuclear weapons--and as the senior official in charge of personnel matters, he issued a required reading list of anti-American books that has only recently been toned down. He has been accused by current and former diplomats of using ideological requirements in handing out promotions. And he is known to have gone out of his way to provoke and stall initiatives by U.S. and European countries. Politico-military affairs, which are managed largely out of his office, and counter-crime/counter-drug issues (managed by him until earlier this year, and still subject to his influence) remain two of our most difficult areas for bilateral cooperation at the policy level, with initiatives regularly stalled or stymied by Itamaraty. According to European and Canadian diplomats, our problems with Guimaraes are not unique, and they are awaiting as eagerly as we are his mandatory retirement in November 2009, when he turns 70. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Advisor Garcia: the Academic Leftist - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 10. (C) Many contacts, including most recently Defense Minister Nelson Jobim (ref H), tell us that Marco Aurelio Garcia is one of President's closest advisors, enjoying a BRASILIA 00000177 004 OF 005 longstanding personal relationship with him and exercising an outsized influence. An academic leftist and long-time PT member, Garcia has championed closer relations with leftist governments in the region and beyond, as well as the prioritization of south-south relations. Talking with Americans, he tends to couch negative views of the United States as good-natured jokes from the past ("When I was young, we used to call the OAS 'the Ministry of U.S. Colonies'"; "When I was a young man, the joke was, 'Why has the United States never had a coup? Because it doesn't have a U.S. embassy!'"). In the present, he has taken on President Lula's pragmatic approach to foreign policy, dealing with the United States and other non-leftist countries in order to achieve Lula's objectives. Since the new U.S. Administration has come on board, he has been emphatic in passing along Lula's keen desire to meet soon with President Obama. 11. (C) Garcia's influence as Lula's most trusted foreign policy advisor remains undiminished despite harsh criticism from Brazil's foreign policy elite for being too "soft" on its neighbors, which temporarily gave Itamaraty the upper hand in managing the spate of problems between Brazil and Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay, and Argentina in late 2008. Garcia maintains the lead on contacts with South America's leftist governments, and where he is not the author of Brazil's outreach to countries such as Cuba, South Africa, Iran, and Russia, he is fully supportive and active in advancing these relationships. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Comment: Prepare for the Challenge...and the Change - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 12. (C) The ideological forces currently dominating Itamaraty mean that, in the near term, the Foreign Ministry will continue to represent a challenge for U.S. engagement on many issues. At least through the end of the Lula administration, the ideological bent of certain key policymakers will constrain cooperation in some areas. Pursuing initiatives with Brazil--and particularly those not dear to the principal foreign policymakers--will continue to require a substantial investment of time, strategic preparation, and effort to overcome ideological headwinds, bureaucratic inertia, and more pressing priorities (see also septels). 13. (C) In particular, although Itamaraty will remain a significant player on almost all U.S. initiatives and interests in Brazil, the way forward with the GOB will in large measure involve working with other significant players as well. In the first instance, this means the Presidency, as Lula has made clear his interest in developing a closer relationship with the United States and Garcia, his closest advisor, is the most dependable in reflecting views. Second, this means working with other GOB ministries and agencies that will act as advocates for closer cooperation. Finally, it means drawing in congress, the judiciary, governors, and non-governmental players, and the private sector in particular, which generally support working with the United States and often have the ability to sway decisions in favor of our initiatives. 14. (C) Building supportive coalitions with other Brazilian players as a way to overcome MRE opposition is a tested strategy: on the Tropical Forests Conservation Act debt swap, enhanced visa terms, our NAS LOA, civil aviation, defense cooperation, biofuels cooperation, information sharing, climate change, and a host of other issues, developing initiatives with and working through players other than Itamaraty have been critical elements in our success. Most recently, excellent relations with the Ministry of Justice, BRASILIA 00000177 005 OF 005 Federal Police, and the Presidency were crucial to overcoming last-minute MRE refusal to issue visas to DEA agents preparing to transfer from Bolivia to Brazil (see septel). We expect that gaining Brazilian cooperation on climate change and hemispheric energy security will also depend heavily on working closely with players outside Itamaraty. 15. (C) Over the longer term, in light of the GOB's current efforts to adjust to broader participation on the world stage, we expect that senior Itamaraty policymakers will continue to expand the range of issues on which they are comfortable working in tandem with industrialized countries. During the next decade, the older generation of diplomats, who still often defined their interests as a regional power in opposition to the United States, will be replaced by a large cohort of younger, more pragmatic, and more globally oriented officers. The recognition by at least some senior Itamaraty officials that they have not done a good job of training "Americanists" who understand the United States suggests that there may well be increased openness to new initiatives on this front, especially following the departure of Samuel Guimaraes in 2009. Openness may increase further in 2011 if the Lula government is replaced by one with a less ideological set of senior policymakers. 16. (C) Post believes that it is critical to influence Brazil's new generation of diplomats, which we generally find more accessible and, while still strong nationalists, more ready to consider cooperation where U.S.-Brazil interests coincide. Among the new near-term possibilities we are exploring is the possibility of establishing a more regular program of speakers and digital video conferences with Rio Branco to promote engagement between their diplomatic trainees and U.S. diplomats and other interlocutors. Depending on how this is received, we might consider establishing a "young diplomats" group to allow for additional contact and exposure with U.S. diplomats. Post has also learned that the French instituted a diplomatic exchange program with Itamaraty in 2008, similar to our Transatlantic Diplomatic Fellowship, and now have a diplomat working in Itamaraty's Europe Department. We believe a similar proposal would be a valuable way both to test the waters for cooperation and, if implemented, both to gain further insight into the workings of this key ministry and to give Brazilian diplomats greater understanding of how the USG executes foreign policy. SOBEL |
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