La gran filtraci¨®n
Cable sobre los negocios de Brasil
En enero de 2009 el embajador en Brasilia escribe: "Si Brasil no consigue las llaves de la tienda de caramelos, al menos la oferta de Boeing, debe tener suficientes dulces"
| ID: | 186518 |
| Date: | 2009-01-09 19:49:00 |
| Origin: | 09BRASILIA41 |
| Source: | Embassy Brasilia |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Dunno: | 08BRASILIA1373 08BRASILIA1589 09BRASILIA34 |
| Destination: | VZCZCXRO3655 RR RUEHRG DE RUEHBR #0041/01 0091949 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 091949Z JAN 09 FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3280 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC INFO RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 8907 RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 7090 RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 3332 RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL |
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 000041 SIPDIS STATE FOR WHA AND PM, DEFENSE FOR DEPSECDEF, USDP, USD AT&L E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/08/2019 TAGS: PREL, ETTC, MARR, BR SUBJECT: THE FX2 COMPETITION -- THE GLIDEPATH TO SUCCESS REF: A. 08 BRASILIA 1589 B. 08 BRASILIA 1373 AND PREVIOUS C. BRASILIA 34 Classified By: Ambassador Clifford Sobel. Reason 1.5 (D) 1. (C) SUMMARY. The Boeing F18 Super Hornet has had success in establishing itself as a strong candidate to be Brazil's next generation fighter but still faces strong political opposition. To succeed, the USG and Boeing will need a coordinated strategy aimed at highlighting the Super Hornet's advantages, correcting misinformation and building confidence in the USG's support for the purchase. Ideally, this will involve ongoing outreach from the USG at high levels to the key Brazilian decision makers. See Paragraph 9 for specific recommendations. END SUMMARY. 2. (C) As reported in ref a, the Boeing F18 Super Hornet has become a serious option in Brazil's fighter competition, and is acknowledged by contacts in the Brazilian Air Force as offering the best plane for a competitive price. Although these factors will continue to weigh in Boeing's favor, the Super Hornet cannot at this point be considered the favorite in the competition. There continues to be a strong preconception among many in policy circles that a purchase from France would be in Brazil's best interest, a view strengthened by the recent, well-publicized visit of President Sarkozy to Rio. Even though Sarkozy did not add any new substance to the "strategic partnership" (deals to sell helicopters and submarines were already well-known), the optic of the Presidential visit has worked in Dassault's favor. 3. (SBU) In the last week, there has been new focus in the Brazilian press on the fighter purchase, including some positive statements from Boeing officials and accurate reporting that the Rafale's high price and limited capabilities have caused it to lose every foreign sale for which it has thus far competed. French representatives have tried to spin the Rafale's dismal performance in the global market to be the result USG political pressure rather than the aircraft's shortcomings. The continuing challenge for Boeing in press reporting is the ongoing assumption that there is a risk to choosing the Super Hornet that the USG will exercise some sort of "veto" over the sale at a later date. ELEMENTS OF A SUCCESSFUL BID ---------------------------- 4. (C) As noted in reftels, the FX2 decision will not be based on the capabilities of the aircraft selected and will only be marginally influenced by the price. Brazilian decision makers will be looking at the offers of the competitors to determine which will benefit Brazil, particularly Brazilian defense industry. Boeing, with its worldwide business and access to commercial aircraft production will have an attractive offer, but faces a challenge. Both Dassault and Saab are offering essentially new planes, not yet in production. They are therefore able to offer Brazil whatever role it wants in the fabrication of the planes, not just the final assembly that Boeing will offer. 5. (C) Ref b highlighted the critical importance of technology transfer. With current efforts in Washington to approve technology sharing to the fullest extent possible, we expect Boeing will have a strong offer by the Feb. 2 deadline to respond to the Request for Proposal (RFP). It will be vital, before the final response goes forward, to ensure that it meets all Brazilian requirements. As noted in ref b, it will be critical for the Boeing offer to keep open the possibility of integrating Brazilian made weapons on the F18 at some point. Given the huge emphasis the new National Defense Strategy places on support to Brazilian industry, excluding any opportunity for indigenous products to be used would be a major blow to Boeing's chances. 6. (C) It will be as important as approving the tech transfer itself to overcome the assumption that the USG can step in at a later date to restrict the transfer. While we can explain that we stopped transfer of F16s to Venezuela because of setbacks in democratic governance and interference in the security of neighboring states -- circumstances BRASILIA 00000041 002 OF 003 unthinkable in the Brazilian context -- the Brazilians tend to take the fact that we stopped the transfer as evidence that the United States is an unreliable supplier. To combat this assumption will require ongoing high level USG assurances, both directly to the Brazilian leadership and publicly, that we can foresee no circumstance in which we would restrict the transfer of fighters to Brazil. As the State Department is perceived by Brazilians as the most likely source of a potential veto, it will be critical for high level Department involvement in this effort. 7. (C) In ref b, post reported on the Brazilian Air Force's likely requirements for financing of the new fighters. With the USG's long experience in Foreign Military sales, it should be possible to work out a set of financing arrangements that would offer an advantage over the competition, especially since Boeing believes its aircraft will have the lowest life cycle costs. KEY PLAYERS ----------- 8. (C) The strongest supporters of the Super Hornet are likely to be the military leadership, in particular Brazilian Air Force chief Brig. Junito Saito, who we believe perceive the Boeing offer as the best deal on the best aircraft and see the United States military as the better choice of a partner going forward. We may also be able to garner support from Brazilian industry, including Embraer, if Boeing can offer strong prospects for longer-term cooperation and mutual profit. While the initial review of the proposals will be done by the Air Force, final decisions will be made at higher levels of the Brazilian government. The final decision will be made by President Lula, who is likely to take a more pragmatic view of which offer would most benefit Brazil, but will also be swayed by arguments regarding how the purchase will affect Brazil's standing as an independent global power. In making a recommendation to Lula, Defense Minister Jobim will play the key role at the policy level. While Jobim has a good relationship with the USG, he has been a strong public supporter of the strategic partnership with France. Foreign Minister Amorim and Minister for Strategic Planning Roberto Mangabeira Unger will also have a say; both see a purchase from the U.S. as leading to an undesirable "dependency." Finally, presidential advisors, including Civilian Household Minister Dilma Rousseff and Foreign Policy Advisor Marco Aurelio Garcia, will likely serve as sounding boards for Lula as he makes a decision. RECOMMENDATIONS --------------- 9. (C) As we look to the next three to four months as the key period in which the fighter competition may be won, there are several opportunities for the USG to maximize our chances: -- The key step for the USG over the next month will be to get the question of technology transfer right. While the Brazilians will not get the keys to the proverbial candy store, there should be enough sweeteners in Boeing's offer to make the case that the Super Hornet includes the best tech. The offer must also address the key points raised in ref b (source codes, weapons integration, etc.). -- Once the RFP response is in, we should be prepared to raise the FX2 at every high level contact with Brazil. There has been a perception that USG support is weak that needs to be countered. The most effective way of doing so would be to have President Obama make a strong statement advocating the Super Hornet to President Lula at the earliest opportunity. The President Elect's outstanding popularity with Brazilians, the personal affinity that Lula has publicly expressed, and the high expectations for relations with the new U.S. Administration will ensure that his advocacy will have an impact. -- We should follow up the RFP response submission with visits from appropriate officials to reassure the Brazilian government of USG support for Boeing's proposal. Ideally, this would begin with an interagency team (State, OSD, DTSA, SOUTHCOM) visit in February at Assistant Secretary level to try to put to rest the notion that there could be a USG veto. Visits should include a public diplomacy component. -- Government to government efforts should be supplemented BRASILIA 00000041 003 OF 003 by improved outreach to highlight the advantages of the Super Hornet and counter misinformation campaigns from the other competitors that the USG will not be a reliable partner. -- Washington agencies should be prepared to receive BRAF finance representatives in February to discus likely Brazilian requirements. SOBEL |
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