El d¨¦ficit econ¨®mico de Cuba
Cable de EE UU que se?ala que la econom¨ªa cubana tiene armas para evitar el desplome
Describe sus problemas de liquidez, endeudamiento externo y eventual ca¨ªda de la asistencia de Venezuela
| ID: | 210203 |
| Date: | 2009-06-04 13:54:00 |
| Origin: | 09HAVANA322 |
| Source: | US Interests Section Havana |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Dunno: | 06HAVANA8017 07HAVANA761 09CARACAS564 09HAVANA308 |
| Destination: | VZCZCXRO0670 RR RUEHAO RUEHCD RUEHGA RUEHGD RUEHHA RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHMT RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHQU RUEHRD RUEHRG RUEHRS RUEHTM RUEHVC DE RUEHUB #0322/01 1551354 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 041354Z JUN 09 FM USINT HAVANA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4442 INFO RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS RUCOWCV/CCGDSEVEN MIAMI FL RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC RUCOGCA/COMNAVBASE GUANTANAMO BAY CU RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC |
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 HAVANA 000322 SIPDIS DEPT FOR WHA/CCA E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/03/2019 TAGS: ECON, PGOV, PREL, EFIN, CU SUBJECT: HOW MIGHT CUBA ENTER ANOTHER SPECIAL PERIOD? REF: A. HAVANA 308 B. 06 HAVANA 8017 C. CARACAS 564 D. 07 HAVANA 761 Classified By: COM Jonathan Farrar for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ------- SUMMARY ------- 1. (C) The combination of new warnings of potential blackouts, serious liquidity issues, and potential (if not already) reduced financial support from Venezuela has sparked rumors on the street and in the international media that Cuba may be headed toward another "Special Period". The reality is that Cuba and Cubans are not as vulnerable as they were in 1989 before the end of Soviet subsidies. However, the Cuban economy remains remarkably dependent on external markets and access to credit. While the level of foreign reserves is a well guarded secret, some analysts and USINT contacts believe the GOC could run out of cash later this year without a significant change of course. Energy austerity measures officially began on June 1, starting with state companies and then potentially moving to households. We expect a reduction in non-fuel imports as a next step. End Summary ----------------------------- Are We There Yet? No, But... ----------------------------- 2. (C) The standard of living for Cubans, while still not as high as twenty years ago before the end of Soviet subsidies, remains much better than the darkest days of the 1990 to 1993 period when GDP fell more than 35 percent. While we expect zero to negative GDP growth in 2009 (Ref A), Cuba's latest challenges have yet to seriously affect the average Cuban. The GOC blames its current macroeconomic woes on the world economic slowdown, the U.S. embargo, a particularly destructive 2008 hurricane season, and general inefficiency and waste. The GOC is quick to point out that no Cuban will be evicted for failure to pay a mortgage and Cuban jobs remain secure while rich countries are experiencing massive layoffs. Nevertheless, the GOC has previewed other difficulties that could soon reach Cuban households. Liquidity Crunch ---------------- 3. (C) Cuba has been in a perennial state of late-payment for decades; sometimes due to legitimate cash shortages and at other times simply as a negotiation tactic. Cuba has long pointed to the crisis of the day to renegotiate short term official debt, and we can not rule out that the GOC is simply using the current world economic crisis to improve its cash position. However, diplomatic contacts agree that Cuba's current liquidity crunch is much deeper than in recent years. Foreign companies are waiting three to six months to receive payment, and some have already agreed to sell their assets back to the GOC (Pebercan) or restructure their accounts receivables (Sherritt) into medium to long term government debt. 4. (C) The latest holdup appears to be at the banking level, as Cuban state companies are reportedly making payments on time but the payment transfers are delayed by the bank for months before being released to the foreign enterprise. Alternatively, the funds are deposited in the foreign company's account for use within Cuba but they are not permitted to transfer the funds abroad or into a foreign currency. Initially, Cuban officials blamed the need to divert resources to assist in the recovery from last year's hurricanes, but now the main culprit appears to be the world economic crisis. A reported collapse in all of Cuba's main sources of foreign currency (nickel exports, tourism, remittances) and an increase in the quantity and price of Cuban imports have magnified an already increasing debt burden. It is clear that the GOC is hemorrhaging cash. Whether it has reached the crisis point or not is less clear. Either way, the Cuban banking sector has lost much of the credibility it had built in recent years, which has led some HAVANA 00000322 002 OF 005 to speculate that long time Central Bank President Francisco Soberon may finally be on his way out. 5. (C) CIMEX, Cuba's largest and most diversified holding company, reported on May 20 that payments for some imports have suffered delays, but the "will of the country" was to meet its financial obligations. CIMEX also reported that remittances were down so far in 2009. CIMEX controls Banco Financiero International, the most important Cuban bank for foreign trade related transactions, and the relationship with remittance providers including Western Union and Canada's Transcard through Financiera CIMEX. According to Reuters, the GOC has called government ministries to cut spending by 6 percent and limit imports. European and Canadian diplomats report reduced exports to Cuba so far this year, especially for machinery and other non-food items. Ironically, and to the visible dismay of our diplomatic colleagues, U.S. exports to Cuba through the first quarter of 2009 were higher than even last year's historic level. This dismay is heightened by the fact that U.S. companies are paid on time while others must wait as reported above. U.S. exports make up much of the food consumed by Cubans and sold in the income generating tourist industry, and U.S. law requires payment in cash in advance. However, there are recent reports that Cuban purchases of U.S. meat products have been cut through the rest of 2009. Threatened Blackouts -------------------- 6. (SBU) In 2005, Fidel Castro announced that his new Energy Revolution would put a stop to blackouts in Cuba by the end of 2006. The GOC took several measures over the next few years to limit future blackouts (Ref B), including increasing household electricity bills, swapping out refrigerators and light bulbs, and importing hundreds of small generators. Despite these steps, the official press announced on May 22 that "exceptional measures to save electricity shall be applied throughout the country starting 1 June in an effort to curb overconsumption, bring every center, municipality, and province in line with their plan, and prevent power cuts." The GOC identified 1,700 state enterprises as high electricity users, 3,000 examples of waste in the public sector, and four provinces with increasing home consumption. The GOC is taking extreme measures to prevent countrywide blackouts. A new austerity plan is being implemented by each municipality and state enterprise to conserve energy. Local energy councils are monitoring the daily use of electricity and local authorities are conducting surprise inspections. In the first few days of the new plan, provinces have been strict in their stated intention to shut off a company's electricity if it exceeds its budgeted allowance. There are reports that the Holguin province shut off the electricity for the offices and warehouses of the three nickel plants due to overconsumption, although the plants themselves continue to operate. 7. (SBU) Although households are not included in the formal austerity program, the official press has highlighted fines levied on residents caught rigging electricity meters, urged personal energy savings, and threatened countrywide blackouts if the situation doesn't improve. The summer 2005 blackouts were a serious strain on Cuban households and the possibility of a return to those days despite years of supposed reform in the sector has clearly disappointed our Cuban contacts. Frequent but short-lived power outages already take place on a daily basis, but many Cubans refuse even to speculate on a return to scheduled blackouts. Blackouts mean spoiled food, no air conditioning during the brutal summer months, and no cooking since the GOC recently swapped most gas stoves with an electric version from China. According to GOC officials, the root of this summer's energy crisis is not a lack of generation capacity (as in 2005) but a shortage of fuel. Cuba uses much of its own heavy crude oil for domestic electricity production, but also relies on imports, in particular Venezuelan deliveries of refined products to power the (diesel) gas guzzling generators. --------------------------------------------- ------------ Potential Triggers: Venezuela, Hurricanes, or Insolvency --------------------------------------------- ------------ HAVANA 00000322 003 OF 005 8. (SBU) Venezuela: In addition to oil deliveries, Cuba and Venezuelan oil conglomerate PDVSA have significant joint ventures in Cuba, Venezuela, and other Petrocaribe countries. Within Cuba, these ventures are focused on building and expanding oil refining capacity, oil prospecting, gas production, maritime transportation (crude oil and byproducts), housing construction, agricultural production, access to potable water, fishing, and transportation services. Potential future operations include increasing storage capabilities, enlarging cargo docks and navigation channels, and constructing a network of pipelines, roads, and services infrastructure. Venezuela has taken over from China a joint venture to build a new nickel plant within three years. In addition, Cuba and Venezuela are working on a fiber optic cable with an ever changing completion date, currently some time in 2010. 9. (C) The GOC started hinting that all was not rosy with its economic relationship with Venezuela when, in an unusually public display, the front page of the Communist Party newspaper Granma reported on May 21 that Venezuela would experience a 50 percent drop in petroleum revenue in 2009. The GOC reference to a lack of fuel rather than generation capacity to explain energy shortages could indicate either a reduction (or delay) in fuel supplies from Venezuela or disappointing refining results through the Cuba/PDVSA joint venture projects. A French diplomat told us that a French company inquiring about its overdue accounts receivable from a Cuban bank was told that the bank had to wait until funds arrived from Venezuela. Cuba is not yet as dependent on Venezuela as it was on the Soviet Union. However, a potential loss of even partial support for the many activities Venezuelan enterprises are now involved in would severely impact several facets of the Cuban economy. A reduction of oil shipments in 2010 (Ref C) could bring the economy to a halt. 10. (SBU) Hurricanes: The 2008 hurricane season devastated many parts of the island (Ref D), but it mostly missed the foreign income generating regions of Havana (tourism and most industry), Matanzas (tourism), and Moa (nickel). It also had only a modest effect on the sugar and tobacco industries. The 2009 hurricane season, which began on June 1, is expected to be less severe than 2008. However, one or two hurricanes that target these regions would cut Cuba's foreign earnings even further and raise serious questions around Cuba's solvency. 11. (C) Insolvency: Cuba effectively ran out of reserves in 1992 at the height of the Special Period. At that time, Cubans experienced extensive cuts in their rations (food, clothing, electricity, and fuel), a near end to public transportation, and strict black market crackdowns. Since the end of the Special Period, Cuba has built up some foreign reserves, but, as one European diplomat with good ties in the Cuban banking sector told us, the exact number remains one of two key national secrets (along with the details of Cuba's financial arrangement with Venezuela). The Central Bank of Cuba has implemented strict new measures limiting foreign currency transactions by foreign companies and further controlling transactions by state companies. The French Commercial Counselor expects Cuba to reach bankruptcy or near bankruptcy by the end of the year. ---------------------------------- Is Cuba Better Prepared This Time? ---------------------------------- 12. (C) Cuba's over-reliance on credit to pay for critical imports and dependence on Venezuela for more than just oil remain Cuba's primary vulnerabilities. In contrast to 1989, however, Cuba has diversified both its trading partners and sources of foreign currency. Whereas the former Soviet Union represented 80 percent of Cuba's total trade in 1989, Cuba's top five trade partners in 2007 represented only 60 percent of total trade (in goods) with Venezuela on top at 20 percent (followed by China with 18 percent, Canada with 10 percent, Spain with 8 percent, and the United States with 4 percent). Detailed 2008 numbers have not been released yet. All of these partners, with the exception of the United States, HAVANA 00000322 004 OF 005 offer Cuba extensive credit. The Spanish Commercial Counselor told us that Spain is close to concluding a renegotiation of its short term debt with Cuba. Spain and Cuba have already agreed on the new structure of the debt (some cancelled, the rest longer term) and the applicable interest rate. The only remaining obstacle is how much new credit Spain will offer Cuba. 13. (C) Some of the reforms that helped bring Cuba out of the Special Period will also provide a cushion for the Cuban economy today. Even with an expected fall in tourism this year, Cuba may receive close to 2 million more tourists than the 340,000 that arrived in 1990. Earlier this year, Cuba re-started licensing private taxi cabs. Local paladars (small, private restaurants) frequented by USINT staff remain profitable self-employment ventures. Although remittances are reportedly down so far this year, presumably due to the world economic crisis, money and visits from family members living abroad remain an important source of income for many Cuban families. In addition, foreign investors remain interested in key sectors like hydrocarbons and tourism in spite of Cuba's liquidity problems, possibly in order to keep a foot in the door before a hypothetical opening to U.S. business. Furthermore, the Cuban government is much better at capturing foreign currency than before 1990 through customs, fees, taxes, and hard currency stores. 14. (SBU) The Special Period is still fresh in the minds of all Cubans. For most, the problem was not one of income but rather of a lack of supply. There was simply nothing to buy and very little provided by the state. As a result, Cubans have spent the past twenty years learning how to "escapar" (literally to escape but usually meant to survive) without relying on GOC assistance. The 2008 hurricanes returned many families in eastern Cuba, Pinar del Rio, and the Isle of Youth to desperate conditions with insufficient government assistance. According to the World Food Program, most hurricane assistance has now been delivered, so victims will have to rely on their own efforts for sustenance (see septel for information on the pending European Community aid package which includes some humanitarian assistance). The destruction caused by last year's hurricanes means that some Cubans don't have as far to fall to reach standards of living similar to the Special Period. 15. (SBU) On May 24, state newspaper Juventude Rebelde reported on interviews conducted to determine how Cubans see the effects of the global economic crisis on the country. Most of the interviewees urged readers to "work harder" and "soldier on" to help the country through this difficult time. One retiree said he didn't think this is going to get as bad as in the worst of the days of the 1990s. Several respondents said Cubans were better prepared since they have been trained to live through similar crises. The article sought to dampen rumors of "catastrophic overtones" including "no oil, soap, and other staples, (and) that the blackouts will come back and that they will be long." The GOC and official press have yet to offer any solutions other than a call on the patriotic duty of all Cubans to save more and spend less. Several GOC officials have echoed a 2005 quote by Central Bank President Francisco Soberon turning the political motto "Fatherland or Death" into its economic equivalent of "Savings or Death". -------- COMMENTS -------- 16. (C) Daily life for most Cubans remains extremely difficult primarily due to a backward and mismanaged economy and the lingering effects of last year's hurricanes. The summer months promise even more hardship as the world economic crisis finally makes its way to Cuban households. Nevertheless, today's Cuban economy is less vulnerable to a return to the lows of the Special Period thanks to more diversified sources of income and credits, a more resourceful Cuban population, and an actual (remittances and travel) and theoretical (end of the embargo) opening of U.S.-Cuban relations. By even mentioning the possibility of blackouts, the GOC is trying to set the expectations of Cubans as low as they can possibly go without triggering public unrest. If HAVANA 00000322 005 OF 005 the GOC can show that Cubans working together can successfully prevent massive blackouts, then it can at least show level of competence and socialist pride. Further risks remain, however, as hurricane season approaches and both Venezuela and Cuba face their own financial crises. FARRAR |
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