Cambio clim¨¢tico
Cable en el que Francia afirma que Copenhague fue un un error
El ministro de Medio Ambiente franc¨¦s reconoce en febrero de 2010 que no se deber¨ªa haber Francia buscado un tratado vinculante
| ID: | 249145 |
| Date: | 2010-02-17 11:30:00 |
| Origin: | 10PARIS183 |
| Source: | Embassy Paris |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Dunno: | 10PARIS1635 |
| Destination: | VZCZCXRO5558 RR RUEHAG RUEHDH RUEHHM RUEHPB RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR RUEHTRO DE RUEHFR #0183 0481130 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 171130Z FEB 10 FM AMEMBASSY PARIS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8324 INFO RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC RUEHZN/ENVIRONMENT SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COLLECTIVE RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE |
C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 000183 SIPDIS E.O. 19528: DECL: 12/03/2019 TAGS: SENV, KGHG, ENRG, FR SUBJECT: CLIMATE CHANGE - BORLOO SAYS DROP "LEGALLY BINDING" REF:09 Paris 1635 Classified by Amb. Charles H. Rivkin for Reasons 1.5 (b)(d) Summary ------- 1. (C) French Environment Minister Jean-Louis Borloo told the Ambassador that the key to advancing climate negotiations is to drop the notion of a legally binding treaty in favor of a system of national commitments. He also argued that it would be up to a small group of eight or ten heads of state, and their sherpas, to negotiate implementation of the Copenhagen Accord. Borloo attributed the European obsession with legally binding treaties to its post-war history and experience in creating the EU by progressively ceding sovereignty via treaty. The key to reaching this kind of deal would be credible action on tradable quotas, forests, and finance including innovative financing mechanisms. The Copenhagen Accord was not a failure, but allowing the means to become the ends was a trap. End Summary. 2. (C) Ambassador Rivkin called on Minister of State for Sustainable Development Jean-Louis Borloo on February 11 to review the Copenhagen Conference and next steps on the Accord. They had last met on the eve of the conference (reftel.) Borloo expressed in several different ways the idea that Copenhagen had gone off track because its approach had been too Western and too European. Major emerging countries were not prepared to cede sovereignty to a treaty, while EU members saw this as both normal and essential. Borloo observed that Copenhagen had, in fact, established a possible global deal on emissions reductions by the United States, China, and Europe. We will not get beyond this balance at the next Conference of the Parties (COP) in Cancun, he said. 3. (C) Borloo insisted that UNFCCC COP negotiators did not have the ability to close a deal after years of ongoing negotiations. It was now up to the major heads of state. He suggested a group of eight or ten: Germany and France for Europe, the United States, China, India, Brazil, Algeria and Ethiopia (and possibly South Africa). Once these leaders, working through their sherpas or personal representatives agree on an implementation plan for Copenhagen, it will be largely acceptable to, and accepted by, the rest of the world, and can then be returned to a UN forum to be finalized. (Borloo dismissed the role of Spain as the current EU Presidency country, saying that Spain has exceeded its Kyoto Protocol targets by 50 percent and is mired by its internal economic situation. The United Nations also did not have any leadership capacity to advance the negotiations, he said.) 4. (C) Borloo argued that the key to implementing the "equilibrium" revealed at Copenhagen was an arrangement that would be voluntary but also automatic in implementation and would include tradable emissions quotas (with linked carbon markets), a forestry mechanism (REDD Plus), and financing, including innovative financing and a fast start mechanism. He commented that China would agree to such a system as far preferable to a U.S. and EU carbon border tax or tariff arrangement. 5. (C) Borloo thought that adhesion to the Copenhagen Accord would be more than adequate to establish its acceptance, and he expected most of Africa and three quarters of the island states to sign on. He relayed that France continues to advocate adhesion and said that he personally was travelling and meeting with key country counterparts, including China and India. 6. (C) COMMENT: Borloo conveyed a strategic view of these negotiations that has changed significantly. We note especially his assessment that a legally binding instrument is not only unnecessary but also impossible. He stressed that unlike some Europeans, the French understood the USG position and had not been critical of the United States at Copenhagen. In fact, he said, the success of the Copenhagen Accord for the USG had been the direct engagement of President Obama. END COMMENT. 7. (U) Borloo also passed a letter from himself, on behalf of the French people, to Secretary of Energy Chu expressing condolences for the loss of life at the Kleen Energy Power plant in Middletown, Connecticut, and expressing his wish that those injured in the explosion recover quickly. The Embassy has faxed the letter to the Department of Energy. RIVKIN |
Traduce este documento ?
Traducci¨®n autom¨¢tica. Puede que el texto traducido no sea fiel al original
Tu suscripci¨®n se est¨¢ usando en otro dispositivo
?Quieres a?adir otro usuario a tu suscripci¨®n?
Si contin¨²as leyendo en este dispositivo, no se podr¨¢ leer en el otro.
FlechaTu suscripci¨®n se est¨¢ usando en otro dispositivo y solo puedes acceder a EL PA?S desde un dispositivo a la vez.
Si quieres compartir tu cuenta, cambia tu suscripci¨®n a la modalidad Premium, as¨ª podr¨¢s a?adir otro usuario. Cada uno acceder¨¢ con su propia cuenta de email, lo que os permitir¨¢ personalizar vuestra experiencia en EL PA?S.
En el caso de no saber qui¨¦n est¨¢ usando tu cuenta, te recomendamos cambiar tu contrase?a aqu¨ª.
Si decides continuar compartiendo tu cuenta, este mensaje se mostrar¨¢ en tu dispositivo y en el de la otra persona que est¨¢ usando tu cuenta de forma indefinida, afectando a tu experiencia de lectura. Puedes consultar aqu¨ª los t¨¦rminos y condiciones de la suscripci¨®n digital.
