Guant¨¢namo
Cable sobre los perfiles de tres presos de Guant¨¢namo propuestos para ser acogidos en Espa?a
"No son santos pero tampoco terroristas duros", defendi¨® el enviado especial para el cierre del penal.
| ID: | 213748 |
| Date: | 2009-06-24 13:58:00 |
| Origin: | 09MADRID604 |
| Source: | Embassy Madrid |
| Classification: | SECRET//NOFORN |
| Dunno: | 09MADRID351 09MADRID551 |
| Destination: | VZCZCXRO7916 PP RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHFL RUEHKUK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHNP RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHTRO DE RUEHMD #0604/01 1751358 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 241358Z JUN 09 FM AMEMBASSY MADRID TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0820 INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUCNISL/ISLAMIC COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHLA/AMCONSUL BARCELONA PRIORITY 4033 RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 0902 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY |
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 MADRID 000604 NOFORN SIPDIS FOR EUR/WE, NEA, S/GC, INR PASS TO NSC FOR RASMUSSEN, BRADLEY E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/20/2024 TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, PHUM, MOPS, KAWK, KISL, KPAO, SP SUBJECT: SPAIN: S/GC DAN FRIED PRESENTS CASE FILES ON GTMO DETAINEES REF: A. MADRID 351 B. MADRID 551 MADRID 00000604 001.2 OF 004 Classified By: CDA Arnold A. Chacon for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 1. (S//NF) SUMMARY: As part of ongoing engagement with the GOS on the issue (See Ref A), Ambassador Dan Fried, the Special Envoy for the Closure of the Guantanamo Detention Facility (S/GC), on June 17 provided a list of four Guantanamo Bay (GTMO) detainees' case files to an inter-ministerial group of Spanish officials for the GOS to consider for resettlement in Spain. Embassy Madrid hand-delivered a fifth case file to the MFA on June 18. Spanish officials emphasized that Spain is disposed to assist the USG and is in solidarity with the Obama Administration on the need to close the GTMO detention facility, but the GOS will need to review the files on a case-by-case basis to ensure that the individuals meet certain legal, security, political and financial conditions. Spanish officials indicated that the profile of detainees would be more important to the GOS than the number accepted; it will be a case of finding the right match. Following the June 17 meetings, President Zapatero, his First Vice President, and FM Moratinos all made public comments emphasizing that any detainees accepted would pose no danger to the Spanish public. Interior Minister Rubalcaba on June 23 told reporters in Washington DC that the GOS could accept "up to five" GTMO detainees for resettlement. END SUMMARY. 2. (C//NF) The GOS delegation was led by two Directors General (DGs) - Assistant Secretary equivalent - from three ministries: Luis Felipe Fernandez de la Pena, MFA DG for non-EU Europe and North America, and Arturo Avello, the Ministry of Interior's DG for International Relations and Alien Issues. The Ministry of Justice was also represented. The detainee issue meeting occurred on the eve of Fernandez de la Pena's June 19 meetings in Washington with EUR A/S Philip Gordon and the NSC and Interior Minister Alfredo Perez Rubalcaba's June 23-24 meetings in Washington with a slew of senior USG officials (See Ref B). //Opening Statements to Explain The Case Files// 3. (S//F) El Pais, Spain's leading daily, on June 17, published a front page story citing GOS sources which suggested that Spain might accept 3-5 detainees, which served as an opening discussion point at the meeting. Ambassador Fried expressed appreciation for the GOS availability to discuss the issue and specifically thanked the GOS for being consistent in its stance of offering to help the USG close the facility. In presenting the four case files (TS-46, TS-502, TS-892, and TS-894) and describing the fifth (YM-252), he explained that the GOS would have essentially the same information that the USG did when it made its determinations about the status of these detainees. He encouraged the GOS to make its own judgments about these five and to let the USG know if case files of others detainees might be more appropriate to find the right fit, although he cautioned that there was competition for the detainees with the least problematic profile and that the detainees would be resettled on a first come, first served basis. Fried emphasized that the USG was open to ongoing discussions to address any specific questions and encouraged the GOS to be in contact via the US Embassy in Madrid, the Spanish Ambassador in Washington, intelligence channels, or directly with the S/GC office. 4. (S//NF) Ambassador Fried stated that if the GOS decided it was willing to accept detainees, the next step would be an exchange of brief diplomatic notes in which the USG would ask that the detainees receive humane treatment, not be extradited to a third-country, and be subject to various other measures, e.g., regarding travel. He added that, when the time came, the USG would work with the GOS to provide information that could be provided to Spain's EU and Schengen partners about the detainees that the GOS planned to accept. Ambassador Fried suggested the GOS ideally would respond to the five case files (four Tunisians and a Yemeni) within two weeks, but also highlighted that the case files of other detainees could be provided to find the right match to suit MADRID 00000604 002.2 OF 004 Spanish interests. //Why the GOS Is Cooperating// 5. (S//NF) Fernandez de la Pena outlined two reasons the GOS was supporting the USG on the detainee issue. First, he stressed that the GOS highly values its relations with the USG, especially at this moment of a revitalization in the bilateral relationship, and that maintaining strong bilateral relations is a GOS priority. He also explained the GOS supported the closure of the GTMO detention facility because it fits in with the Zapatero Administration's counter-terrorism and humanitarian policies. Nevertheless, Fernandez de la Pena commented that the GOS would study the files carefully because the review process was more important than timelines. He predicted that Spain might not be among the countries to accept detainees the most quickly, but nor would it be a laggard. //GOS Legal Criteria// 6. (S//NF) Fernandez de la Pena stated that any detainees that Spain accepts must have "clean" records or Spain will have legal problems. Ambassador Fried replied that the USG has deemed these five detainees suitable for transfer, but acknowledged that each country has its own criteria and emphasized that the USG will work with the GOS on this issue. Fried acknowledged that these five are "no saints" but neither are they hardened terrorists or ideologues. They were living on the margins of society, had drug problems and were recruited as low-level soldiers. Fried assured the Spanish that the detainees were "clean" in the sense that the USG would not be asking the GOS to incarcerate them, but stressed that the GOS security services may well want to monitor them. Fernandez de la Pena and Avello expressed concern that former detainees would arrive in Spain with an "aura" among radicalized Islamic communities, for whom the detainees would become "icons." //GOS Security Criteria// 7. (S//NF) Fernandez de la Pena emphasized that the GOS needs to avoid accepting any detainees that pose a security risk to its EU and Schengen Area partners and suggested that the GOS might need further information from the USG in this regard. It is important to the GOS that those detainees that it accepts have expressed their interest to resettle in Spain, a factor which the GOS may need in writing at a later point in negotiations. Fernandez de la Pena described current Spanish legislation as "toothless" in enforcing any restrictions on the freedom of movement of resettled detainees. //GOS Political Criteria// 8. (S//NF) Fernandez de la Pena noted that the bulk of the case files involved Tunisians and indicated that Tunisia is an important country for Spain, with which it enjoys close relations. He suggested accepting Tunisian detainees could be interpreted as Spain buying into the USG argument that there are "compelling reasons" why the detainees should not be returned to their home country. The Spaniard expressed GOS concern that the issue could sour Spanish-Tunisian bilateral ties. Fernandez de la Pena also made clear that the GOS already had made the political decision that it would not accept any Uighurs, so as not to disrupt ties with China. Avello, however, expressed interest in whether there were any case files on Uzbek detainees. //GOS Financial Criteria// 9. (S//NF) The Spanish raised the issue of what financial contributions the USG was prepared to make on an ad-hoc basis to cover costs associated with the resettlement process. Ambassador Fried replied that the USG was prepared to discuss the issue, but highlighted that the DOD has limited funds for this and that recent press coverage suggesting that Palau was given $200 million to accept 13 detainees was wildly off the mark. Noting that the GOS is not a poor country, Fried suggested $85,000 per person was a more likely figure to help defray certain actual costs. MADRID 00000604 003.2 OF 004 //Detainees' Connection to Spain// 10. (S//NF) Asked if any of the five detainees had a connection to Spain, Ambassador Fried replied that they did not. Some had connections to Italy, their experiences there had not been satisfactory ones. Fernandez de la Pena likened detainees prospective connection to Spain to a "double-edged sword." He said it would be a good selling point to the public to be able to say that they did have a Spanish connection, but if they did then Spain would run the risk of one of the GTMO "icons" radicalizing Spain's Muslim community. //The Role of NGOs// 11. (S//NF) Fernandez de la Pena indicated that the GOS had been approached by a number of NGOs - including UK-based Reprieve - which have sought to act as intermediaries for certain detainees. He added that the GOS response has been that the USG had not yet made any specific requests regarding specific cases. Ambassador Fried encouraged the GOS to approach the S/GC office and ask if what the Spanish are hearing from lawyers or NGOs is accurate. //Universal Jurisdiction// 12. (S//NF) Fernandez de la Pena noted that Lakhdar Boumediene, the former detainee recently resettled in France, had announced his intentions to sue the USG. Asked if the USG assessed that this would become a pattern, Ambassador Fried replied that perhaps so, but the USG cannot do anything about that and will proceed with the resettlement of detainees. In a brief follow-on meeting with the US delegation, Deputy FM Angel Lossada re-confirmed Spanish willingness to be helpful and noted that Madrid was taking steps to limit the future ability of resettled detainees citing Spain's "universal jurisdiction" laws, to sue the USG. //The Role of the Media// 13. (S//NF) Both Fernandez de la Pena and Lossada stressed the GOS's preference in keeping discussions on the detainee resettlement issue - especially the numbers of case files and nationalities of detainees - out of the media, to which Fried and Embassy Madrid readily agreed. Nevertheless, within half an hour of the U.S. delegation's departure from the MFA, FM Moratinos told a press conference the number of files provided to the GOS and detailed the context of the discussions. President Zapatero and First Vice President Maria Teresa Fernandez de la Vega also voiced their support for engaging with the US on this issue. Meanwhile, following a phone call with Fried, Congressman Gustavo de Aristegui, a foreign affairs expert in the center-right Popular Party, the primary opposition party, also publicly voiced his support for GOS efforts to accept detainees. By June 22, the Spanish media, citing GOS sources, had identified the nationalities of all five detainees. Interior Minister Rubalcaba on June 23 told reporters in Washington DC that the GOS could accept "up to five" GTMO detainees for resettlement. //Comment// 14. (S//NF) Ambassador Fried's meeting took discussions with the Spanish on this issue to the next step - going from the general discussions to providing specific case files for them to review. In this meeting, the Spanish showed they are serious about the issue and are inclined to follow-through on their stated goodwill. The Zapatero Administration's public remarks are likely the initial stages of a public diplomacy campaign designed to lay the groundwork for the Spanish public's acceptance of the eventual resettlement in Spain of some detainees. Embassy Madrid believes the USG would be well served by refraining from making public statements about our specific discussions with the GOS on this issue and instead keeping the focus on generalities and appreciation for Spain's willingness to discuss options. While Post is aware of Spanish press reports suggesting that "at least two" of the Tunisians may be unacceptable to the GOS because of MADRID 00000604 004.2 OF 004 their criminal backgrounds, Post has not yet heard any official response to the case files from the GOS. 15. (U) This cable was cleared by Ambassador Fried. CHACON |
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